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ON THE
EMPLOYMENT
OF
TIME.

THREE ESSAYS.

THE SECOND EDITION.

By Jean Bolton



L O N D O N :

Printed for J. WHISTON, at *Boyle's Head*, in *Fleet-street*;
R. DODSLEY, at *Tully's Head*, in *Pallmall*; and
W. RUSSEL, at *Horace's Head*, without *Temple-Bar*.

M.DCCLI.

[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS.]

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Printed for J. W. Smith, at the British Museum, in Pall Mall; and
R. D. Smith, at the British Museum, in Pall Mall; and
W. H. Smith, at the British Museum, in Pall Mall.

MDCCLII

[Price Two Shillings]



TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
PHILIP Lord HARDWICKE,
Baron of *HARDWICKE*,
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR of
GREAT-BRITAIN.

MY LORD,



CANNOT assign a better reason for addressing to your Lordship these *Essays on the Employment of Time*, than that you have, from your earliest years, so eminently approv'd your sense of its importance.

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IN thus dedicating them, I may be consider'd but as entring on this subject——as only proposing the Pattern, before I enlarge on the Rule.

YOUR Lordship's *Pleasure* has, indeed, generally been a varied *Application*; and your fatigue in liberal pursuits reliev'd, not by *quitting*, but by *changing* them.

WHATEVER Admiration may have been express'd at your dispatch of so much public business, it appears a very small part of your desert to them who have known your domestic engagements——how well your duty in other relations has been remembred, amidst such attention to it in the high Offices you have sustained and adorned.—But what I ought to say of you, I must not to you. Wholly silent I could not be on a Character so proper to be oppos'd to the mischievous examples of so many high in *titular* worth,

DEDICATION. v

worth, but in *real*, on a level with the meanest of their *Species*.

It is unpleasant to reflect on our fellow-creatures shewing such far greater regard to example than to precept—to what others are, than to what themselves ought to be: yet as things are thus, and thus, in all probability, will continue, he who wishes well to mankind should seek their benefit in the way they will receive it——should, since they will not reason but imitate, point out to them where their imitation will have *most* of the appearance of reasoning, where their being guided by another's practice would look like using their own understanding.

THE rules of decorum may restrain me from proceeding on the subject of your personal worth in the language of my inclination; but I have the pleasure to think that they even counte-

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nance the freest declaration of your
desert from me ; and that I am con-
sulting them, when, after so many
favours receiv'd from you, I, with the
utmost gratitude and respect, express
myself,

My LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's most Obliged,

Most Obedient, and

Most Humble Servant.



P R E F A C E.



THE *Essays* I here publish, though at first penn'd for the benefit of some of the author's neighbours in the country, may, it is hop'd, from the alterations since made in them, be of more general use. *The subject* of them is, in itself, of the highest importance, and could, therefore, never be unseasonably consider'd; but the general practice, at present, more especially entitles it to our notice. The principles on which *their argumentative part* proceeds, are deny'd by none whose conviction it consults. Such as regard the human frame as only in its mechanisim excelling that of beasts — such as would deprive man's breast of social affections, exempt him from all apprehensions

ensions of a Deity, and confine his hopes to his present existence, are not the *persons* whom any thing here said proposes to affect. They are not, I mean, directly apply'd to in this *Work*; but even their benefit *it* may be said consequentially to intend, as *it* would certainly contribute thereto, could *it* properly operate on those whose advantage is its immediate aim.

WE have been told, by very good judges of human nature, how engaging Virtue would be, if it came under the notice of sense. And what is a right practice, but Virtue made, in some measure, the object of sense? What is a Man ever acting reasonably, but, if I may so speak, impersonated Virtue——Virtue in a visible shape, brought into view, presenting itself to the sight, and through the sight as much affecting the mind, as it could be affected by any elegance of form, by any of the beauties of colouring or proportion?

THE notions most dishonourable to the *Deity*, and to the *human species*, are often, I suspect, first taken up, and always, certainly, confirm'd by remarking how They act whose speculations express the greatest honour towards *both*.

WHEN the strongest sense of an all-powerful and wise, a most holy and just Governor of the
the

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the world, is profess'd by those who shew not the least concern to please him——when reason, choice, civil obligations, a future recompence, have for their advocates such as are govern'd by humour, passion, appetite ; or who deny themselves no present pleasure or advantage, for any thing that an hereafter promises ; it naturally leads others, first, to think it of little moment which *side* is taken on these points, and then, to take *that* which suits the manners of them who, in their declarations, are *its* warmest Opposers.

WHEREAS, were the *apprehensions* that do justice to a superintending providence——an immaterial principle in man——his liberty——his duties in society——his hopes at his dissolution, to be universally evidenc'd by a suitable practice ; the great and manifest advantage arising from them would be capable of suppressing every *doubt* of their truth, would prevent the entrance of any, or would soon remove it.

As, indeed, all that we are capable of knowing in our present state, appears either immediately to regard its wants, or to be connected with what regards them, it is by no means a slight confirmation of the truth of a doctrine, That the persuasion thereof is of the utmost conse-

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consequence to our present well-being. And thus the great advantages that are in this life derivable from the belief of a future retribution—that are here the proper fruits of such a belief, may be consider'd as evidencing how well it is founded—how reasonably it is entertain'd. On this it may be of some use more largely to insist.

WHAT Engagements correspond to the conviction that the state in which we now are is but the passage to a better, is consider'd in the last of these *Essays*: And that, when so engag'd, we are acting the *part* befitting our nature and our situation, seems manifest both on account of the approbation it has from our calmest hours, our most serious deliberation and freest judgment, and likewise on account of the testimony it receives even from them who act a quite contrary one. What they conform not to, they applaud; they acknowledge their failures to be such; they admire the worth, which they cannot bring themselves to cultivate.

If we look into the writers who suppos'd all the pleasures of man to be those of his body, and all his views limited to his present existence; we find them, in the rule of life they gave, deserting the necessary consequences of their
their

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their *supposition*, and prescribing a morality utterly inconsistent with *it*. Even when they taught that what was good or evil was to be determin'd by our feeling only——that right or wrong was according to the pleasure or pain that would ensue to us during the continuance of our present frame, since after its dissolution we have nothing to hope or fear; their practical directions were, however, that * we ought to be strictly just, severely abstinent, true to our friendships, steady in the pursuit of honour and virtue, attentive to the

* Invitat vera ratio bene sanos ad justitiam, æquitatem, fidem. *Tull. de Fin. l. 1.*

Sic ab Epicuro sapiens semper inducitur, Finitas habet cupiditates; negligit mortem. *Ibid.*

Nemo de tenui victu plura dixit. *Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.*

De amicitia Epicurus ita dicit: “Omnium rerum, quas
“ ad beatè vivendum sapientia comparaverit, nihil esse
“ majus amicitia, &c.”

Eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in seipsum. *Ibid.*

Illa, quæ Peripatetici, quæ Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt, in judiciis, in senatu, “Officium, æquitatem,
“ dignitatem, fidem, recta, honesta, digna imperio, dig-
“ na populo Romano, omnia pericula pro republica, mori
“ pro patria.” *De Fin. l. 2.*

“Ουκ εστιν ηδεις ζην, ανευ τῆ φρονιμως, η καλως, η δικαίως.
Epic. Menoceo. Diog. Laert. l. x.

“Υπερ φιλα σολε τεδινηξισθαι. Diog. Laert. l. x.

Και μαζα η υδωρ την ακροατην αποδιδωσι ηδωην, &c. Epic.
Menoceo.

public

public welfare, and willing to part with our lives in its defence.

SUCH they admitted man ought to be—such they exhorted him to be, and, therefore, when they would allow him to act only upon *motives* utterly incongruous to his being this person, it follow'd, either that these were wrongly assign'd, or that a conduct was requir'd from him unsuitable to his nature.

THAT his obligations were rightly stated was on all hands agreed. The mistake was in the inducements alledg'd for discharging them*. Nothing was more improbable than his fulfilling the duties this *scheme* appointed him, if he was determined by it in judging of the consequences of his actions——what good or hurt they would do him——what happiness or misery would be their result.

WHILE the *Epicureans* admitted justice to be preferable to injustice——a public spirit, to private selfish views; while they acknowledg'd it more fitting that we should sacrifice life to the good of our country, than preserve it by deserting the common welfare; they must, I think, be regarded as authorising a preference

* Illud quæro, quid ei, qui in voluptate summum bonum putat, consentaneum sit dicere. *De Fin.* l. 2.

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of the principles which will make man just and public-spirited, to those which will dispose him to be unjust, and wholly attentive to his own little interests.

LET us see, then, what will be the practical consequences of adopting or rejecting the *Epicurean* tenet of our having nothing to hope for beyond the Grave.

THE value we set on life is shewn by what we do to preserve it, and what we suffer rather than part with it *. We support ourselves by the hardest labour, the severest drudgery, and we think death a much greater evil, than to struggle for years with disease and pain, despairing of cure, and even of any long intervals of ease. Such, ordinarily, is our love of life. And this desire to keep it cannot but be greatly increas'd, when we are induc'd to

* *Quis est, aut quotus quisque, cui, mors cùm appropinquet,*

Non refugiat timido sanguen, atque exalbescat metu?
& si hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturæ tam valde perhorrescere; quod item est reprehendendum in dolore. Sed quia fere sic afficiuntur *omnes*, satis argumenti est, ab interitu naturam abhorrere—Maximè autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturæ, cùm & mendicitatem multi perpetiantur, ut vivant; & angantur appropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute; & ea perferant, quæ Philoctetam videmus in fabulis, &c. *Tull. de Fin. l. 5.*

think

think that once lost it is so for ever. To be without all hope of again enjoying the blessing we thus highly prize, must naturally disincline us to hazard it, and indispose us for what will endanger its continuance. He who is persuaded that *corporeal pleasure* is all he has to expect, and that it is confin'd to his present existence, must, *if he acts agreeably to such a persuasion*, be wholly intent on the pursuit of that pleasure, and dread nothing more than its coming to an end, or being interrupted. Hence, if his term of life would be shorter, or any greater distress would accrue to him by adhering to truth and justice, than by departing from them——if he were to be at present more a loser by assisting his friend, than by forsaking him——if he could promise himself a larger share of sensual gratifications from betraying his country, than from serving it faithfully, he would be false and unjust, he would be perfidious to his friend, and a traitor to his country *. All those sentiments and actions that

* Nemo unquam sine magna spe immortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem——Inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum——quo quidem dempto quis tam esset amens, qui semper in laboribus & periculis viveret. *Tusc. Quæst. l. I.*

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that express an entire attachment to the *delights of sense*, and the strongest reluctance to forego *them*, are strictly in character when we look not beyond them——when we acknowledge not any higher *satisfactions*, and behold *these* as expiring with us, and sure never to be again tasted.

WHEREAS the prospect of a returning life and of enjoyments in it far superior to any we now experience, or promise ourselves, has a necessary tendency to lessen our solicitude about the existence here appointed us. We cannot well be reconciled to the *loss* of our being, but are easily so to its *change*; and death consider'd as only its change, as the passage from a less to a more desirable state, will, certainly, have the terror of its appearance much abated. The conviction that there is a greater good in reserve for us than any pleasure which earth can afford, and that there is something far more to be fear'd by us than any pain we can now be made to suffer, will, in proportion to its strength, render us indifferent to the delights

Non quæritur, quid naturæ tuæ, Torquate, consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinæ. Ratio ista, quam defendis; præcepta, quæ didicisti, quæ probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam: quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in cœlum efferat laudibus. *De Fin.* l. 2.

and

and conveniencies of our abode on earth, and dispose us to qualify ourselves for obtaining that greater good, and avoiding that so much more to be dreaded evil. In these *considerations* of life and death, of happiness and misery, Virtue has its proper support. We are by *them* brought to judge rightly of the part becoming us, and to adhere to it immoveably : *they* furnish sufficient inducements to avoid falsehood and injustice, of whatever immediate advantage we may be thereby depriv'd——*they* encourage us to serve our friend and country with the utmost fidelity, notwithstanding all the inconveniencies that can be suppos'd to attend it——they are, indeed, proper incitements to prefer the public welfare to our own safety, while *they* represent to us how much our gain thereby would overbalance our loss.

BRUTES in our end and expectations, how can we be otherwise in our pursuits? But if the reasoning principle in us be an incorruptible one, and its right or wrong application in this embody'd state affect the whole of our future existence ; we have, in that apprehension, the most powerful motive to act throughout in conformity to our rational nature, or, which is the same thing in other words, never to swerve from Virtue——to despise alike danger
and

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and pleasure, when standing in competition with our duty.

THUS, when SOCRATES, in PLATO's *Phædo*, has prov'd the immortality of our soul, he considers it as a necessary consequence of the belief thereof, *That we should be employ'd in the culture of our minds—in such care of them as shall not only regard that term, to which we give the name of life, but the whole which follows it—in making ourselves as wise and good as may be, since on it our safety entirely depends, the soul carrying hence nothing with it, but its good or bad actions, its virtues or vices, and these constituting its happiness or misery to all eternity.*

So when the elder SCIPIO is introduc'd by TULLY * apprising the younger, *that what is call'd our life, may be more properly stil'd our death—that we truly live, when we are freed from the fetters of our body ; he proceeds to observe, how much it then concern'd him to be just—to promote the public welfare—to make true glory his aim, doing what is right without regard to any advantage it will now yield him, despising popular opinion, adhering to virtue for its real worth. And the Youth*

* *Somm. Scip.*

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thus instructed, professes, *That after such information into what state he is to pass, he would not be wanting to himself: Unmindful he had not been of his ancestors worth, but to copy it should now be his more especial care, since encourag'd thereto by so great a reward.*

LUCAN, representing the inhabitants of this part of *Europe* as persuaded that the soul surviv'd the dissolution of the body, † congratulates them, indeed, only on the happiness they enjoy'd in an opinion that freed them from the most tormenting of all fears, the dread of death—that made them act with so much bravery and intrepidity. But when he admits a contempt of death to be the proper effect of this *opinion*, he must be consider'd as allowing it all that practical influence which as naturally results from it, as such an indifference to life doth, and has the same connexion with it.

† *Lucan. Phars. l. 1.*

In primis hoc volunt persuadere ; Non interire animas
——atque hoc maximè ad virtutem excitari putant,
metu mortis neglecto. *Cæf. de Bel. Gal. l. 6.*

Παρ' ἔδδ'εν τιθέμενοι τὴν τῷ βίῃ τελευτήν. Ἐπισχύει γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς
ὁ Πυθαγόρας λόγος ὅτι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτους εἶναι συμ-
βέβηκε, *Diod. Sic. l. 5.*

Tacitus speaks of the same persuasion among the *Jews* producing the same effect. Animas——æternas putant.
Hinc——moriendi contemptus. *Hist. l. 5.*

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IF, therefore, the persuasion that death renders us utterly insensible, be a persuasion that unmans us quite——that disposes to a course of action most unworthy of us—that is extremely prejudicial to society, and tends, in every way, to our own greatest hurt or debasement, we may well suppose it an erroneous one; since it is in the highest degree improbable, that there should be any truth in a notion the reception of which so far operates to the prejudice of mankind——so necessarily contributes to introduce a general disorder.

On the other hand, if, from the conviction that there is a recompence for us beyond the grave, we derive sentiments most becoming us——if from it the worthiest actions proceed——if it be the source of the greatest both private and public good——if with it be connected the due discharge of our duty in the several relations in which we are plac'd——if it alone can lead us to perfect our nature, and can furnish our state with satisfactory enjoyments; there may seem sufficient grounds to conclude that there is such a recompence; the persuasion thereof, thus affecting us, may well appear most reasonably entertain'd.

WHEN all those principles, of whose truth we have the greatest certainty, conduct us to happiness, it is natural to think that the influence of any principle upon our happiness should be no improper test of its truth.

If there be no surer token of a right practice, than its tendency to promote the common good, can we but judge that to be a right opinion, which has undeniably, in an eminent degree, such a tendency?

* WHEN the difficulties that, under a general corruption, attend our adherence to virtue, are only to be surmounted by the prospect of a future reward; one knows not how to believe that the proper inducement to our acting a part so becoming us——so much our praise, should be no other than a chimerical view, a romantic and utterly vain expectation.

WHEN error is manifestly the cause of whatever ill we do or suffer, it is extremely improbable, that to an erroneous notion we must stand indebted for the best use of life, and its most solid satisfactions.

* Nullo modo fieri potest, ut quisquam tanti æstimet æquitatem & fidem, ut ejus conservandæ causâ nullum supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus assensus sit, quæ falsæ esse non possunt. *Acad. Quæst.* l. 4.

BUT

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BUT it may be ask'd——Where does this opinion produce these boasted effects? Among them who profess it their firmest belief that there is a future recompence, how few do we find better men for it——more regular in their manners, or more useful to the world, than they would have been without any such persuasion?

How far any truth shall operate upon us——how far it shall influence us, depends upon our application of it, upon our attention to it. Experience furnishes the utmost certainty of a vast variety of *particulars* highly interesting our present welfare, which yet we overlook, we give ourselves little or no concern about, tho' we thereby make ourselves the severest sufferers; and may be almost as sure as we can be of any thing, that our unconcernedness about them must be attended with consequences thus fatal to us. The several rules which regard the lengthening of life——the preservation of health——the enjoyment of ease, tho' they carry with them the clearest evidence of their importance, how very little weight have they with the generality of mankind——how unheeded are they, when opposing an eager appetite, a strong inclination!

while yet these rules are acknowledg'd to remain as true, as worthy of our notice, as certain in their salutary effects when observ'd, as if all that practical regard to which they are entitled, was paid them; and we may be as justly thought endow'd with a capacity of discovering those effects in order to their profiting us, as if they universally took place.

WHAT benefit was intended in qualifying us for the discernment of any truth, is by no means to be inferr'd from what *ordinarily ensues* to us when discerning it. A just inference as to this can only be made from regarding the dictates of Reason upon such a truth being discern'd by us; or, what use of its discernment Reason directs us to make.

WHEN we are less wicked than very bad principles prompt us to be, which is often the case; these are, nevertheless, full as blameable as they would be, if we were to act consistently with them. That they are not *pursu'd*, is, as to them, quite an accidental point; in reason and nature they should be, and therefore are fitly chargeable with all the consequences that acting according to them would produce.

So, on the other hand, tho' it must be confess'd, that, with the best *principles*, our course
of

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of life is, frequently, very faulty; the objection must lye not to the nature or kind of their influence, but to a weakness of it, which is *our* crime, and not *their* defect. We will not let them act upon us, as they are qualify'd to do. Their worth is to be estimated by the worth they are suited to produce. And it would be full as absurd, when we will not mind our way, to deny that the light can be of any help to us in seeing it; as to deny the serviceableness of any principle, because we fail in its application.

Nor is it, indeed, only our unhappiness that we are inattentive to what *the belief of a future recompence* requires from us; Religion itself is, alas! every where abus'd to the obstructing the proper effects of this belief. I mean, that whatever Religion is any where profess'd, some or other rite or doctrine of it *does* favour, as in Paganism and Mohammediism; or *is so constru'd*, as in Judaism and Christianity, that *it is made* to favour a departure from the practice which suits the persuasion of a future reward. The reproach that belong'd to the Jews in our Saviour's time, they have, as far as appears, deserv'd ever since; That by their scrupulous regard to the lesser

points of their Law, they think they make amends for the grossest neglect of its most important precepts. And with respect to us Christians, * Whence is it, that there is so little virtue among us—that we are throughout so corrupt, but from taking sanctuary for our crimes in our very Religion—from perverting its most holy institutions and doctrines to be our full security, whatsoever are our vices? †

Thus, we are either of a Church in which we can be absolv'd of *all* our *sins*; or we are

* Sir ISAAC NEWTON having observ'd, *That the prophecies concerning CHRIST's first coming were for setting up the Christian religion, adds, which all nations have since corrupted, &c.* Observ. upon the Proph. of Dan. &c. p. 252.

† The general and great defect in those that profess the Christian Faith is, that they hope for life eternal without performing those conditions, whereupon it is promis'd in the Gospel, namely, repentance and reformation.—— They will trust to a *fruitless, liveless faith*, or to some *penances*, and *satisfactions*, and *commutations* made with God, doing what he hath not requir'd instead of what he hath commanded. No persuasions shall prevail to move and excite them to do this, no reasons, arguments, or demonstration, no not the express words of God, that it is necessary to be done; or to forbear to censure them as *Enemies to the Grace of God*, who do with clear and express Scripture shew the absolute necessity of it. *Owtram's Sermons*, p. 166, 167.

of

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of the number of the Elect, and cannot commit *any*; or the merits of Christ atone for our not having the merit even of honesty and sincerity; or a right Faith makes amends for our most corrupt practice. *

WE have Prayers, Sacraments, Fasts, that are never thought of to improve us in virtue, but to supply the want of it—to quiet our consciences under the most culpable gratification of our lusts.

How the belief of a future recompence should, in reason, affect our practice——what its proper and natural influence is, solely concerns the present argument. It seems enough, in the case before us, that no one can be consistent with himself, but, if he has any hopes of happiness in another world, his conduct will be regular, becoming, rational: and, that where we find these hopes

* I heartily wish, that by public authority it were so order'd, that no man should ever preach or print this doctrine, That Faith alone justifies, unless he join this together with it, That universal Obedience is necessary to salvation. CHILLINGWORTH's *Relig. of Prot.* p. 262.

By our zeal in our opinions, we grow cool in our piety and practical duties. *Epist. Dedicat. prefix'd to the Discourse of Liberty of Proph.*

entertain'd

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entertain'd on mature confideration, juſtly reaſon'd upon, duly attended to, there we, certainly, find great purity of morals, a ſtrict regard to the part befitting a reaſonable creature, and every other advantage aſcrib'd to *them*. If I cannot be allow'd to infer from hence that they are well founded, they have ſtill for their ſupport all thoſe arguments in favour of a final retribution, with which I have not at all meddled, nor in the leaſt weaken'd by any thing I may have leſs pertinently obſerv'd. The ſubject of the Third of the following *Effays* led me to the Remarks here made; and to me they appear not immaterial. I cannot, indeed, bring my ſelf to think but that the hopes which induce me to act moſt agreeably to my Creator's will, he has form'd me to entertain; and will not let me be diſappointed in them,

Of one thing I am ſure, That they who ſuffer the perſuaſion of a future happineſs to operate, as it ought, on their practice, conſtantly experience their practice adding ſtrength to their perſuaſion; the better they become by their belief, the more confirm'd they become in it. This is a great deal to ſay on its behalf. What weightier recommendation to our aſſent can any *doctrine* have, than that,

as

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as *it* tends to improve us in virtue, so the more virtuous we are, the more firmly we assent to *it*; * or, the better judges we are of Truth, the fuller assurance we have of *its* truth?

Ὁ σπουδαῖος ἕκαστα κρίνει ὁρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τ' ἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιάζει καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα. καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος, τῷ τ' ἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾷ, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. Aristot. Ethic.



O N

XXVII

PREFACE

As we begin to improve in our time, so the more
various we are, the more firmly we adhere to
the better things we are of. Thus,
the further we are from the world,


the more we are from the world. Thus,
the more we are from the world, the more
we are from the world. Thus, the more
we are from the world, the more we are from the world.



ON THE
EMPLOYMENT *of* TIME.

ESSAY the FIRST.

Tunc demum intelliges, quid faciendum tibi, quid vitandum sit, cum didiceris quid naturæ tuæ debeas. SEN. Ep. 121.

“MAZING! That a Creature,
“ so warm in the pursuit of her
“ Pleasures, should never cast one
“ thought towards her Happi-
“ nefs.”——A Reflection this, made indeed
by a comic Writer, but not unworthy the most
serious.

To be intent on Pleasure, yet negligent of
Happiness, is to be careful for what will ease

us a few Moments of our Life, and yet, without any Regard to what will distress us for many Years of it.

WHEN I study my Happiness, I consult the satisfaction of the whole Continuance of my Being—I endeavour, that throughout it I may suffer as little, and enjoy myself as much, as my Nature and Situation will admit. Happiness is lasting Pleasure; its pursuit is, really, that of Pleasure, with as small an alloy as possible of Pain. We cannot, therefore, provide for our Happiness, without taking our share of Pleasure; tho', as is every where but too evident, our eagerness after Pleasure may plunge us into the Misery we are unable to support *.

NOTHING, indeed, is more specious than the general Term † Pleasure. It carries with it

* Ut feras cum labore periculoque venamur, & captarum quoque illarum sollicita possessio est; sæpe enim laniant dominos: ita habentes magnas voluptates, in magnum malum evasere, captæque cepere. *Sen. de Vit. beat.*

Accipite—orationem Archytæ Tarentini, magni in primis & præclari viri—Nullam capitaliorem pestem, quam corporis voluptatem, hominibus dicebat à natura datam. *Tull. de Senect.*

† Voluptas est malorum esca; quod eâ non minus homines quam hamo capiuntur pisces. *Plaut.*

Divine Plato escam malorum voluptatem appellat, quod eâ

it the Idea of something which must be permitted us by our Maker; since we know not how to suppose him forbidding us to taste what he has disposed us to relish. His having formed us to receive Pleasure, is our Licence to take it. This I will admit to be true, under proper Restrictions.

It is true, that from our Nature and Constitution * we may collect wherein we act agreeably to our Creator's Will, and wherein we act contrary to it: but the Mischief is, we commonly mistake our Nature, we miscall it; we call That it, which is but a Part of it, or the Corruption of it; and we thence make Conclusions, by which when we govern our Practice, we soon find ourselves in great Difficulties and Distress.

ea videlicet homines capiantur, ut hamo pisces. Tull. de Senect.

* Primam illam partem bene vivendi à natura petebant: eique parendum esse dicebant: neque ulla alia in re, nisi in natura, quærendum esse illud summum bonum, quò omnia referrentur: constituebantque, extremum esse rerum expetendarum & finem bonorum, adeptum esse omnia è natura & animo, & corpore, & vita. *Acad. Quest. I. 1.*

Quod summum bonum à Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturæ vivere; id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper. *Tull. de Off. 1. 3.*

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FOR Instance, we call our Passions our Nature; then infer, that, in gratifying them, we follow Nature; and, being thus convinc'd that their Gratification must be quite lawful, we allow ourselves in it, and are undone by it. Whereas, the Body is as much the Man, as his Passions are his Nature; a Part of it, indeed, they are, but the lowest Part; and which, if more regarded than the higher and nobler, it must be as fatal to us, as to be guided rather by what is agreeable to our Appetite, than conducive to our Health. Of this more hereafter.

THE Call of Nature being the favourite Topic of all the Men of Pleasure——of all who act the most in contradiction to Nature, I will confine the whole of the following Essay to the Consideration of it, so far as it relates to the Employment of our Time; and shew how our Time should be employed, if we have a just regard to our Nature——if what it requires be consulted by us.

THAT Man is the work of a wise Agent, is in the clearest manner discovered by the Marks of Wisdom, that shew themselves in his Frame——* by the contrivance and skill,

* *Corporis nostri partes, totaque figura, & forma, & statura, quàm apta ad naturam sit, apparet. Tull. de Fin. l. 5.*

that

that each Part of it expresses——by the exact proportion and suitable disposition, that the several Parts of it have to each other, and by their respective fitness to promote the well-being of the whole.

WHEN we must thus acknowledge the great Wisdom exerted in our Structure ; when we are so capable of discerning its Beauties and Advantages, and so fully know their preservation and improvement to depend upon ourselves, upon our own Endeavours, Care and Pains ; we cannot possibly be at a loss to discover what our wise Maker must, in this particular, expect from us. The Duty of Man is as certainly known from his Nature——what he ought to do for himself is as fully understood from what he can do, as the Uses of any Machine are understood by a thorough acquaintance with its Powers.

I CAN no more doubt for what I am intended——what must be required of me, when I see plainly what I am able to effect ; than I can question for what purposes a Watch or Clock is design'd, when I am duly apprised how the different Parts of it act upon each other, to what they all concur, and to what only.

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WE want no Reasoning to convince us, that a Frame so curious as the human, must be made in order to its continuance, as long as the Materials composing it will admit; and that we ourselves must give it such continuance: how this is shortened, how it is prolonged, we are likewise all of us fully sensible. There is no Man but perceives what will hasten his Dissolution, and what will, probably, retard it; by what Management of himself he is sure to pass but few years in the World, and by what he is likely to be upheld in it for many. Here then our Rule is obvious; these notices afforded us make it so: When we are taught, that the Support of our Life must be agreeable to him from whom we received it, and that *we* are appointed to give it this Support, that it must come from *ourselves*, from what *we* do in order to it; we are at the same time instructed to regard all things contributing to it as enjoin'd us, and all things detrimental to, and inconsistent with it, as forbidden us; we have it suggested to us, that we are properly employ'd, when we consult the due preservation of Life; and that the Engagements are improper, are blameable, that hinder it.

THUS,

THUS, to spend our time well, we must give our Bodies such exercise, such rest, and other refreshments, as their subsistence demands; and we mispend it, when we are lazy and slothful, when we are less sober, chaste and temperate*; when we proceed to Excesses of any kind, when we let our Passions and Appetites direct us: Every thing in this way tends to hasten our Dissolution; and therefore must be criminal, as opposing that Continuance here, which our very Composition shews our Maker to have design'd us.

BUT that our Frame should be barely upheld cannot be all we are to do for it; we must preserve it in its most perfect State, in a State in which its several Powers can be best exerted†.

* *Formato homine, qualis est, eo ipso quod talis naturæ & conditionis factus sit, constat etiam Deum voluisse, ut sobrius—& castus esset. Sunt hæ & hujusmodi leges naturæ immutabiles. King de Orig. Mali, 125.*

† *Ita finis bonorum existit, secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optimè affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissime.*

Quoniam autem sua cujusque animantis natura est, necesse est quoque finem omnium hunc esse, ut natura expleatur. Et max, Non dubito dicere, omnem naturam esse conservatricem sui, idque habere propositum quasi finem & extremum, se ut custodiat quàm in optimo sui generis statu. Tull. de Fin. l. 5.

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To take this care about it is evidently required of us. Any Unfitness for the functions of life is a partial Death. I don't see of what we can well be more certain, than that all the Health and Strength, of which our Constitution admits, were intended us in it; and they must, therefore, be as becoming our Concern, as it is to hinder the ruin of our Constitution. We know not how sufficiently to lament the Loss of them, even from the Advantage of which they are to us in themselves, not only from their preventing the uneasiness, the pains, and the numerous inconveniences with which the Sickly and Infirm have to struggle, but likewise from the Satisfaction they give us in our being, from what we feel, when our Blood flows regularly, our Nerves have their due Tone, and our Vigour is entire.

YET these are but the least of the Benefits we have from them.

WE * consist of two Parts, of two very different Parts; the one inert, passive, utterly in-

* Perspicuum est, hominem è corpore animoque constare, cum primæ sint animi partes, secundæ corporis. Deinde id quoque videmus, & ita figuratum corpus, ut excellat aliis, animumque ita constitutum, ut & sensibus instructus sit, & habeat præstantiam mentis, cui tota hominis natura pareat. *De Fin. l. 5.*

capable

capable of directing itself, barely ministerial to the other, moved, animated by it. When our Body has its full health and strength, the Mind is so far assisted thereby, that it can bear a closer and longer Application, our Apprehension is readier, our Imagination is livelier, we can better enlarge our compass of Thought, we can examine our Perceptions more strictly, and compare them more exactly; by which Means we are enabled to form a truer Judgment of things—to remove more effectually the Mistakes into which we have been led by a wrong Education, by Passion, Inattention, Custom, Example—to have a clearer view of what is best for us, of what is most for our Interest, and thence determine ourselves more readily to its pursuit, and persist therein with greater Resolution and Steadiness.

THE Body in a sound state can be thus serviceable to the *Mind*, and when made so, may in its turn be as much profited by *it*. The Poet's Observation is no less true of them, than it is of Nature and Art, each wants, each helps the other;

* "Mutually they need each other's aid." *Roscom.*

* ————— Alterius sic
Altera poscit opem res, & conjurat amicè. *Hor. de Art. Poet.*

THE

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THE † Mind, when not restrain'd by any thing deficient in its companion, and having from it all the assistance it is adapted to afford, can with much greater facility prevent that Discomposure and Trouble, by which our bodily *Health* is ever injur'd; and preserve in us that Quiet and Peace, by which *it* is always promoted. Hence we are to conclude, That we should forbear, not only what necessarily brings on Disease and Decay, but whatever contributes to enfeeble and enervate us; not only what has a direct tendency to hasten our End, but likewise what lessens our Activity, what abates of our Vigour and Spirit.— That we should also avoid whatever is in any wise prejudicial to a due Consideration of things, and a right Judgment of them; whatever can hinder the Understanding from properly informing itself, and the Will from a ready compliance with its Directions. We must be intent on such a Discipline of ourselves as will procure us the fullest use of our Frame, as will capacitate us to receive from it the whole of the Advantage it is capable of yielding us; so exercising the Members of our

† *Ha perfecta atque plena (sententia) eorum, qui cùm de hominis summo bono quærerent, nullam in eo neque animi, neque corporis partem vacuum tutelâ reliquerunt. De Fin. l. 4.*

Body,

Body, consulting its Conveniences, supplying its Wants, that it may be the least burdensome to us, may give us the least Uneasiness——That none of its Motions may, through any fault of ours, be obstructed, none of its Parts injured——That it may be kept in as unimpair'd, as athletic a state as our Endeavours can procure, and all its Functions perform'd with the utmost exactness and readiness; so guarding, likewise, against the Impressions of Sense, and Delusiveness of Fancy, so composing our Minds, purifying them, divesting them of all corrupt Prejudices, that they may be in a disposition equally favourable to them, and to our Bodies *——That they may not be betrayed into mistakes dangerous to the Wellfare of either——That they may be in a condition to discern what is becoming us, what is fittest for us; desirous of discovering it, and prepared to be influenced by it.

WE are thus to seek our most perfect State, such as allows us the freest use of our several Powers, a full Liberty *for the due Application of them.* And the Ability thus to apply them, must be in order to our doing it, to our receiving from them whatever Service they can effect.

* Quicquid animum erexit etiam corpori prodest. Sen. Ep. 78.

† As

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† As what is corporeal in us is of least Excellence and Value, our Care in general about it, should bear a proportion to the little Worth it has in itself——|| should chiefly regard the reference it has to our Understanding, the assistance that it may afford our intellectual Faculties.

MERELY to preserve our being—to possess our Members intire——to have our Senses perfect——to be free from Pain——to enjoy Health, Strength, Beauty, are but very low Aims for human Creatures. The most perfect State of animal Life can never becomingly engross the Concern of a rational Nature : fitted for much nobler and worthier Attainments, we are by that Fitness for them call'd to pursue them †,

ASK

† Sic gerere nos debemus, non tanquam propter corpus vivere debeamus, sed tanquam non possimus sine corpore, *Sen. Ep. 14.*

|| Stultitia, consensu omnium philosophorum, majus est malum, quàm si omnia mala & fortunæ, & corporis, ex altera parte ponantur, *Tul. de. nat. Deorum, l. 3.*

Vir magnus & prudens animum diducit à corpore, & multum cum meliore & divina parte versatur ; cum hac querula & fragili quantum necesse est. *Sen. Ep. 78.*

‡ Hi (Aristippus & Cyrenaici) non viderunt, ut ad cursum, equum ; ad arandum, bovem ; ad indagandum, canem ; sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, intelligendum & agendum esse natum. *De Fin. l. 2.*

Quibus

Ask those of either Sex, who rate highest the recommendation of Features, Complexion, and Shape——who are most intent on adorning their Persons——who study most the accomplishments of an outward Appearance; ask them, I say, which they think their chief Endowment, and what it is that does them the highest Honour? You will find them with one consent pronouncing it *their Reason*. With all their Folly they will not defend it as such: with their little Sense, they will prefer that little to their every other fancied Perfection. The finest Woman in the World would rather make Deformity her choice than Idiocy, would rather have Ugliness than Incapacity her reproach*.

Thus, likewise, whom do we perceive so fond of Life, so desirous of reaching its longest Term, that he would be willing to survive his

Quibus expositis, facilis est conjectura, ea maximè esse expetenda ex nostris, quæ plurimum habent dignitatis: ut optimæ cujusque partis, quæ per se expetatur, virtus sit expetenda maximè. Ita fiet, ut animi virtus corporis virtuti anteponatur, &c. *De Fin.* l. 5.

Animi cultus, quasi humanitatis cibus. *Ib.*

Sicut aves ad volatum, equi ad cursum, ad sævitiam feræ gignuntur; ita nobis propria est mentis agitatio atque solertia. *Quinct.* *de Inst. Orat.*

* Stulti sine dubio miserrimi, maximè quòd stulti sunt: miserius enim stultitiâ quid possumus dicere? *De nat. Deor.* l. i.

Un-

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Understanding; that he would chuse to live after he ceas'd to reason? the Health and Ease, the Vigour and Chearfulness that are often the Lunatic's Portion, would not induce the most infirm, sickly, and complaining among us, to wish himself in his stead, to wish an exchange of his own distemper'd Body, for the other's disorder'd Mind.

Nor does the mind only claim our chief Regard, as it is thus universally acknowledg'd, and as it really is the principal, the most excellent, the presiding Part of us, but as our Well-being is necessarily connected with giving it this Preference †, with bestowing the most of our Care and Pains upon it.

WHAT is best for the Body, what is best for the whole Man, can only be discover'd and provided for, by our rational Faculties, by them assiduously cultivated, diligently exerted, and thence strengthen'd and enlarg'd.

OUR Well-being wholly depends upon the sufficient Information of our Understanding *,
upon

† Quæ pars optima est in homine, in ea situm esse necesse est illud, quod quæris, optimum. *Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.*

* Democritus, luminibus amissis, alba scilicet & atra discernere non poterat: at verò bona, mala; æqua, iniqua; honesta, turpia; utilia, inutilia; magna, parva poterat:

upon the Light in which we see Things, upon the Knowledge we have how far they can profit or hurt us, how the Benefit they can be of to us may be deriv'd from them, and how the Hurt they can do us may be escap'd †.

If I think that to be good, or that to be evil, which is not such——or if I know not that to be good, or that to be evil, which is really such——or if I think there is more or less Good, or more or less Evil in any thing than there really is——or if what, by a proper application, might be made of very great Advantage to me, I am ignorant how to make of any, or of as much as it would yield me——or if I am ignorant how to render that very little, or not at all, hurtful to me, which might have

terat: & sine varietate colorum licebat vivere beatè; sine notione rerum non licebat. *Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.*

Intrandum est in rerum naturam, & penitus, quid ea postulet, pervidendum. Aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. *De Fin. l. 5.*

Non qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro

Nescit Aquinatem potentia vellera fucum,

Certius accipiet damnum, propiusve medullis,

Quàm qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.

Hor. Ep. l. i. 10.

† Οἱ τῆς αὐτῶν διανοίας ἀμελεῦντες, λελήθασιν ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἅμα τοῦτα φρονεῖν ἀμεινον, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν βέλτιον ὀλιγοροῦντες. *Isoc. Orat. de permut.*

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its Evil either greatly lessened || or wholly avoided: in all these Instances, I must of necessity be greatly a Sufferer; my Ignorance must abate much of the satisfaction of my Life, and heighten its uneasiness.

No one is prejudic'd by his not desiring what he conceives to be good, by his Disinclination towards it, by his Unwillingness to embrace it. So far is this from being our Case, that we are always pursuing it. The source of all our Motions, the design of all our Endeavours is to better ourselves, to remove from us that which is really, or comparatively evil.

WHAT alone hurts us is our Misapprehension of Good †, our mistakes about, our Ignorance of, it. Let us fully understand it— have just conceptions of it, we then shall never deserve the blame of its being less earnestly fought after, and therefore unattain'd by us. The excess of our Earnestness after it, is, indeed, usually the occasion of missing it. Our Solitude, our Eagerness and Impatience are here so great, that they won't allow us time

|| Multa incommoda in vita sapientes commodorum compensationem leniunt, stulti nec vitare venientia possunt, nec ferre præsentia. *De nat. Deor.* l. i.

† Qui non naturâ, sed culpâ vitiosi esse dicuntur, eorum vitia constant è falsis opinionibus rerum bonarum, ac malorum. *Tusc. Quæst.* l. 4.

to examine appearances——to distinguish between them and realities——to weigh what is future against what is present——to deliberate whether we do not forego a much greater advantage hereafter, by closing with that which immediately offers; or shall not have it abundantly overbalanc'd, by its mischievous consequences.

WE want not to be put on the pursuit of happiness, but we want very much to have that pursuit rightly directed; and as this must be done by the improvement of our rational powers, we can be interested in nothing more than in improving them, than in such an application of them, as will contribute most to perfect them.

WE are so plac'd, that there are very few of the *objects* surrounding us, which may not be serviceable or hurtful to us; nor is that service to be obtain'd, or detriment avoided, otherwise than by our acquaintance with *them*, and with ourselves: the more exact our knowledge of this kind is, the more we lessen the calamities, and add to the comforts of life*: and it certainly must be as much the in-

* Omnium rerum naturâ cognitâ, levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum,

intention of our Creator, that we should attain the *utmost* good which we are capable of procuring ourselves, as that we should attain *any* for which he has qualified us.

NOR is the benefit arising to us from an enlarg'd understanding render'd less certain, by the uneasiness that we find to be the share of the studious, the contemplative, and learned — of them whose intellectual attainments we chiefly admire.

The Philosopher's observation to his friend on *books*, that it signifies nothing * *how many*, but *what* he had, is applicable to the Knowledge they communicate: What it is, and not how various, is the thing that concerns us. It may extend to a prodigious number of particulars of no moment, or of very little †;

rum, è qua ipsa horribiles existunt sæpe formidines. *De Fin. l. 1.*

Nemo reperitur, qui sit studio nihil consecutus. *Quinct. de Instit. Orat.*

* Non refert quàm multos, sed quàm bonos habeas. *Sen. Ep. 45.*

† Unum studium verè liberale est, quod liberum facit. Hoc sapientiæ studium est, sublime, forte, magnanimum: cætera pusilla & puerilia sunt. — Plus scire velle quàm sit satis, intemperantiæ genus est. Quid, quòd ista liberarum artium consecratio molestos, verbosos, intempestivos, sibi placentes facit, & ideo non discentes necessaria, quia supervacua didicerunt? *Sen. Ep. 88.*

and

and that extent of it gain us all the extravagance of applause, tho' we have the ignorance of the vulgar, where it must be of the worst consequence.

CROWDING our memory is no more improving our understanding, than filling our coffers with pebbles is enriching ourselves || : and what has commonly the name of Learning, what usually denominates us *very learned*, is, really, no more than our memory heavily and uselessly burthen'd.

How high is the desert, in the more eastern parts, of him who can but read and write the language of his country ‡? A life spent in the study of *it alone* shall be there judg'd an exercise of Reason most worthy of applause. And are we in these so enlightened regions, in this school of Science, as we are apt to fancy it, at all more just to rational improvements? We have, indeed, no encomiums for him who is not at a loss for the meaning of any word that his native tongue furnishes ; but he who

|| There is nothing almost has done more harm to men dedicated to letters, than giving the name of study to Reading, and making a man of great Reading to be the same with a man of great Knowledge. *Locke of the Conduct of the Understanding.*

‡ Josephus Acofta narrat——omnem Sinarum eruditionem reverà in legendo & scribendo consistere. *Spizel. de re lit. Sin.*

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is well skill'd in two or three antient ones, will have the highest applause for that skill, and be consider'd among them, who have distinguish'd themselves, by a right application of their capacities *. In this number we, likewise, generally agree to place such as have pass'd years in only qualifying themselves either to cavil and dispute †, or to disguise their ignorance on any subject, or to colour strongly, and command the passions of their hearers ||. We are equally favourable to them, who busy their minds on discoveries that have no foundation ‡ but in fancy and credulity — or

* *Linguae sunt duntaxat vehicula scientiae. Bacon de Augm. Sci.*

† *Dicunt veri inveniendi causâ contra omnia dici oportere, & pro omnibus. Volo videre quid invenerint. Acad. Quæst. l. 4.*

Negat Cicero, si duplicetur sibi ætas, habiturum se tempus quo legat Lyricos, eodem modo Dialecticos. Tristiùs inepti sunt.——Nihil minùs convenit quàm subdola ista calliditas, animis conantibus magna. *Sen. Ep. 49.*

|| *M. Antoninus*, among other things, which he considers as order'd by Providence in his favour, mentions this, τὸ μὴ ἐπίπλεόν με προκόψαι ἐν ἑητορικῇ καὶ ποιητικῇ. *De rebus suis, l. 1.*

‡ Si quis ad intuentum ea, quæ magis curiosa habentur quàm sana, animum submiserit, & Alchymistarum aut Magorum opera penitus introspecterit, is dubitabit forsitan, utrùm risu, an lachrymis potius illa digna sint. *Verulamii Nov. Org.*

whose

whose whole endeavour it has been to learn what this or that Man has determin'd on a point, wherein he was as ill qualified as themselves to make a right determination *,—— or who amuse themselves with † Theories, with trifling and vain speculations.

LET a just allowance be made for these, and such like persons, whose reputation for learning is only built on the generality miscalling it, on the prevailing mistakes about it, and who have really hurt their understandings by what is thus falsely esteem'd improving them || ; we shall have proceeded a great way in removing

* In moribus & institutis Scholarum, Academiarum, Collegiorum, & similibus conventuum, quæ doctorem hominum sedibus, & eruditionis culturæ destinata sunt, omnia progressui Scientiarum adversa inveniuntur. Lectiones enim & Exercitia ita sunt disposita, ut aliud à consuetis haud facile cuiquam in mentem veniat cogitare, aut contemplari. *Nov. Org.*

† Alius error fuit ex nimia reverentia, & quasi adoratione intellectus humani : unde homines abduxere se à contemplatione naturæ, atque ab experientia, in propriis meditationibus susque deque volutantes. *De Augm. Scient. l. 1.*

Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφου — ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς φρονιζούσας τὰ τοιαῦτα μαρτυροῦσας ἐπεδείκνυνεν. *Xen. de fact. & dict. Socratis, Ec. l. 1.*

|| Philosophi quantum habent supervacui, quantum ab usu recedentis ? —— Audi quantum mali faciat nimia subtilitas, & quàm infesta veritati sit. Protagoras ait,

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moving the objection to the pursuit of knowledge, from the little service it is of, to such whose attainments in it we concur in acknowledging and admiring.

WHEN our intellectual pursuits *are* useful, they are often limited to what is of least use †. How few of us are prompted to our researches from the consideration of the degree or extent of the good derivable from them? It is humour, fancy, or sordid * gain alone, that ordinarily gives rise to the very Inquiries which are of advantage to the world; they seldom are made from a regard to their proper worth, from the influence they can have upon our own or others happiness.

de omni re in utramque partem disputari posse, ex æquo; & de hac ipsa, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit. Nausiphanes ait, ex his quæ videntur esse, nihil magis esse, quàm non esse. Parmenides ait, ex his quæ videntur esse, nihil esse in universum. *Vid. pl. Sen. Ep. 88.*

† Omnium gravissimus error in deviatione ab ultimo doctrinarum fine consistit. Appetunt enim homines scientiam, alii ex insita curiositate, & irrequieta: alii existimationis gratiâ: alii contentionis ergo, atque ut in differendo superiores sint: plerique propter lucrum & victum: paucissimi, ut donum rationis divinitus datum in usus humani generis impendant. *Bacon de Augment. Scient.*

* Meta scientiarum vera & legitima, non alia est quàm ut dotetur vita humana novis inventis & copiis. At turba longè maxima nihil ex hoc sapit, sed meritoria planè est & professoria. *Verulamii Nov. Organ.*

THAT

THAT the better our understanding is inform'd, the better it can direct us, must be as evident to all, as that we want to be directed by it. The mind of man is as much assisted by knowledge, as his eye by light. Whatever his intellectual powers may be in themselves, they are to him according to his application of them : as the advantage he receives from his sight is according to the use he makes of it. That ignorance of his *Good* which he might, but will not, remove, deprives him of it as certainly as an utter inability to acquaint himself with it.

IN what is the improvement of our understandings, we may, indeed, be mistaken, as we may in what constitutes our true happiness ; but in each case we must be wilfully so, we must be so by refusing to attend, to consider.

COULD we by instinct discover our own good, as the brute distinguishes its good, all concern on our part to increase our discernment might be needless ; but the endeavour after this must be in the highest degree necessary, when the more clearly we discern things, the more we are benefited, and the less hurt by them. Where is the Man who is not made happier by inquiries that are rightly

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directed, and when he can say with the Poet †
 ————— the search of Truth,

*And moral decency hath fill'd my breast ;
 Hath every thought and faculty possess'd ?*

OF knowledge, as distinct from true Wisdom, it may be not unjustly observ'd, that the increase of it is only the increase of sorrow || ; but of that knowledge, the pursuit of which expresses our wisdom ‡, we may confidently assert, that our satisfaction must advance with it. All will admit it a proof of wisdom, to judge rightly of what is most for our interest *, and take such measures as suit it : and as we are qualified for this by our knowledge, by the knowledge of our own nature, and of the properties of the things

† Quid verum atque decens, curo, & rogo, & omnis in hoc sum. *Hor. Ep. l. i. i.*

|| Certum est nullam animi anxietatem, aut perturbationem oriri è scientia, nisi tantum per accidens. Omnis enim scientia, & admiratio, quæ est semen scientiæ, per se jucunda est : cum autem conclusiones inde deducuntur, quæ obliquè rebus nostris applicatæ, vel infirmos metus gignunt, vel immodicas cupiditates, tum demum nascitur cruciatus, & perturbatio mentis. *Bac. de Augm. Scient.*

‡ Neminem invenies, qui non putet & sapientiam bonum, & sapere, *Sen. Ep. 117.*

Socrates hanc summam dixit esse sapientiam, bona malaque distinguere. *Sen. Ep. 71.*

————— ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἐν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν μόνον κακὸν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν. *Diog. Laert. l. 2.*

with-

without us, so far as they can contribute to our better or worse state †; in the degree we are thus knowing we can only be wise, determine rightly of what is best, and use the fittest means to procure it. Attainments that serve not to this purpose may be slighted; but for such as are requisite to it, if they principally deserve not *our concern*, I see not what can have any title to it ||.

WE are, indeed, startled at the very terms of deliberating, weighing, considering, comparing; we have affix'd such ideas to them, as make them appear rather hindering the true enjoyment of ourselves, than promoting it: but if we would not share the uneasiness that so many of our fellow-creatures lament, we must not adopt their prejudices. In every point of consequence we use more or less consideration; and

† Unâ re consummatur animus, scientiâ bonorum ac malorum immutabili. *Sen. Ep. 88.*

Quid est bonum? rerum scientia. Quid malum est? rerum imperitia. Ille prudens atque artifex pro tempore quæque repellat aut eliget. *Sen. Ep. 31.*

|| Since our Faculties plainly discover to us the being of a God, and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty, and great concernment; it will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those Faculties we have, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where
it

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and in all the pleasures that allure ||, in all the trifles that amuse us, we are still making comparisons, preferring one to the other, pronouncing this less, and that more worthy of our choice. Tho' none, if the Philosopher may be believ'd, deliberate on the whole of life, all do on the parts of it: and if we fail not to compare and reason upon our *lower* enjoyments, I see not what there can be forbidding in the advice to attend seriously, to examine fairly, and to delay our choice till we have gain'd the instruction requisite to determine it, when the object thereof is what can be *most* for our ease and satisfaction.

BUT it is not, perhaps, all exercise of our reason, in a way so well deserving it, that disgusts us; it is *the degree* of application requir'd from us, that we relish not.

it seems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to conclude that our Proper Employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowledge, which is most suited to our natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, the condition of our eternal state. Hence, I think, I may conclude, that Morality is the proper Science, and Business of mankind in general. *Locke's Essay on Human Understanding.*

|| Quæ libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine animi motu & cogitatione perficitur? *De nat. Deor.* l. 3.

I. We

1. We know not how to be reconcil'd to so much trouble about enlarging our discernment, and refining our judgment.

2. We do not see how such a task can suit them whose whole provision for the day is from the labour of it.

3. We find no small part of mankind so quite easy under their ignorance and mistakes, that they will not advance a step to remove them: and what greater recommendation can there be of any situation, than that they who are in it are entirely satisfied with it?

1. THE pains that we are to take in order to an advantage that must infinitely overbalance them, we can have no excuse for omitting; and we are call'd to no pains for the improvement of our reason, but such as cannot be declin'd without lessening our happiness—without incurring some evil we should otherwise have escap'd, or wanting some good we should otherwise have obtain'd: whatever has its neglect attended with these consequences, must be expected from us *.

2. THAT

* How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who lay out all their

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2. That they are to seek knowledge who are to get their bread, might seem a harsh lesson, if the endeavour to inform hinder'd that to maintain themselves; if the *knowledge* they were to seek was any other but *of what is best for them*, of what can give them all the happiness that creatures so constituted can receive. For *this* every one must have leisure; * it should be judg'd our chief business; it directs

their incomes in provision for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of coarse patches, and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased Chance, or their Country Taylor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with) to cloath them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes. *Locke's Essay on Human Understanding*, B. iv. Ch. 20.

* Are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance in those things which are of greatest importance to them? Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance, to conduct them to their happiness or misery?—God has furnished men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure. No man is so wholly taken
up

directs us to that very employment from which we have our support — is carried on with it——assists us in it——gives it every consideration that can make it easy and satisfactory to us. The Peasant or Mechanic is not advis'd to spend fewer hours at labour, that he may have more for study, for reading and contemplating —— to leave his spade or his tools for a pen or a book. No, the advice to him is, Observe what passes, and what good or hurt accompanies or follows it.

REMARK what it is that pleases you only for a few moments, and then either brings immediate uneasiness, or lays a foundation for some future.

You find several things of service to you, observe which is of most, which has no sort of inconvenience attending it, or very little in comparison of its advantage; and if there are none of them without some inconveniences, which has the fewest —— which

up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time to think at all of his soul, and inform himself in matters of Religion. Were men as intent on this, as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life, who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge. *Locke's Essay on Human Understanding.*

does

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does you good in a higher degree, or for a longer term.

You are continually with those of the same nature with yourself; take notice what is serviceable or prejudicial to them; you may learn from their experience what your own teaches you not. Every day will furnish some or other occurrence that may be a profitable lesson to you, make it such; overlook nothing that affects your well-being; attend chiefly to what concerns it.

Go over frequently in your thoughts the Observations you have made on what will more or less benefit you; let them be so deeply imprinted upon your mind, make them so familiar to yourself, that the offer of a less good may never surprise and betray you into the neglect, and, by that means, the loss of a greater.

You are at all times at liberty to consider your own nature, be acquainted with it, see what you can do for yourself, what share of your happiness has no dependance on the things without you; what blessings may be secur'd to you by your own dispositions.

You necessarily shun evil: don't mistake it; be sure of what is so; be appris'd of the degrees of it; be thoroughly instructed in these,
that

that a desire to escape what you could easily bear, may never occasion you a Distress which you would pronounce insupportable. Endeavour to inform yourself what evil you cannot too industriously avoid——what you should readily submit to——what you may change into good.

HE to whose situation terms like these would be unsuitable, must have *Reason* to seek as well as a *Livelihood*. Our natural understanding fits all of us for a task like this; nor can it be inconsistent with any the hardest Labour to which our support will oblige us.

THE whole of this so severe a Lesson is this brief one: Do your best for yourself; be as happy as the right use of the abilities God has given you can make you.

3. As for the unconcernedness of so great a part of our species at their ignorance and errors * —— the entire satisfaction they express under

* An tibicines, iique qui fidibus utuntur, suo, non multitudinis arbitrio, cantus, numerosque moderantur: vir sapiens, multò arte majore præditus, non quid verissimum sit, sed quid velit vulgus, exquiret? An quidquam stultius, quàm, quos singulos, sicut operarios barbarosque contemnas, eos aliquid putare esse universos? *Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.*

Nihil magis præstandum est, quàm ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non quàm eundum

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under them: with regard to this, let it be consider'd, that we are no more to judge of good from the practice of Numbers, than of truth from their Opinions.

THEY thoroughly enjoy themselves, you say, with their little knowledge, and many mistakes.

AND are any of us in our younger years better pleas'd, than when we are suffer'd to sport away our time—to pass it without the least controul and instruction? But because we are thus pleas'd, are we rightly so? Could worse befall us, than to be permitted to continue thus agreeably unrestrain'd and uninstructed? †

THE man in a lethargy desires you would let him dose on: he apprehends no danger,

dum est, sed quâ itur. Atqui nulla res nos majoribus malis implicat, quàm quòd ad rumorem componimur, optima rati ea quæ magno assensu recepta sunt, quorumque exempla multa sunt; nec ad rationem, sed ad similitudinem vivimus. Inde ista tanta coacervatio aliorum supra alios ruentium——Argumenti pessimi turba est. Quæramus quid optimè factum sit, non quid usitatissimum: & quid nos in possessione *felicitatis æternæ* constituat, non quid vulgo, veritatis pessimo interpreti, probatum sit. Vulgum autem tam Chlamydatos quàm coronam voco. *Sen. de Vit. beat.*

† In iis morbis quibus afficiuntur animi, quò quis pejus se habet, minùs sentit. *Sen. Ep. 53.*

when

when you see the greatest : you grieve and vex him, when you attempt to cure him.

DOES any one, who has more sense than the bulk of his fellow-creatures, wish for their dullness, that he might share their diversions——wish for their thoughtlessness, that he might join in their mirth ?

COULD the neglect of our rational faculties be accompany'd, throughout our continuance in being, with the satisfaction at present express'd by so many under it, this indeed might be something in its favour ; but this is by no means the case. He who gave us these faculties, and the ability to improve them, must intend that we should improve them : by frustrating his intention, we incur his displeasure ; if we incur it, we may justly expect, sooner or later, to feel the effects thereof.

NOR is it to be thought that the neglect of our reason is, from the good we hereby forego, its own sufficient punishment, and therefore not likely to expose us to any other. We cannot rightly think thus, because of the extensive mischief occasion'd by this neglect. It is very far from terminating in ourselves, from making us the only sufferers. * Were

* *Nemo sibi tantum errat. Sen. de Vit. beat.*

D

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it so confin'd, some pretence there might be for considering our mere crime as our ample punishment. But such it cannot appear, when it does infinite hurt to others—to our neighbourhood—to our friends—to our family—to the whole community of which we are members.

WHAT is enough for myself, what I can do without, should be the least of my concern. My Duty is to reflect what I can do for others; how I may make myself of greatest use. We stand all largely indebted to our fellow-creatures; and, owing them so much, if we neglect to qualify ourselves for serving them, we greatly injure them. But as this is not the place for pursuing these reflections, I will now only remark, of what deplorable consequence it is to our Children (whose title to our endeavours for their benefit all acknowledge) that the culture of our minds is so little our care—that we slight the rational improvements, with a capacity for which our Creator has so graciously favoured us*.

UNAPPREHENSIVE of the mischief our Offspring must necessarily receive from our sloth,

* Qui se deteriorem facit, non sibi tantummodo nocet, sed etiam omnibus eis quibus melior factus prodesse potuisset. *Sen. de Vit. beat.*

our intemperance, and other criminal gratifications, we impair their frame before it is yet compleated ; we entail on them misery, before we give them life.

* THEIR reason seems to be watched in its appearance, only that it may be applied to for its speedier corruption. Every thing they are at first taught to value, is what they cannot enough despise ; and all the pains that should be taken to keep their minds from vain fears, are employed to introduce them.

THE chief of what our memory receives in our childhood, is what our maturer age most wishes to forget.

* Simul atque editi in lucem, & suscepti sumus, in omni continuò pravitate, & in summa opinionum perversitate versamur : ut pænè cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur. Cùm verò parentibus redditi, demum magistris traditi sumus, tum ita variis imbuimur erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, & opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat. *Tusc. Quæst. l. 3.*

Utinam liberorum nostrorum mores non ipsi perdere-mus. Infantiam statim deliciis solvimus.—Ante palatum eorum, quàm os, instituimus —Gaudemus, si quid licentius dixerint. Verba, ne Alexandrinis quidem permittenda deliciis, risu & osculo excipimus. Nec mirum ; nos docuimus, ex nobis audierunt, nostras amicas, nostros concubinos vident. Omne convivium obscœnis canticis strepit, pudenda dictu spectantur. Fit ex his consuetudo, deinde natura. *Quinct. l. 1.*

WHILE we are ignorant how hurtful it is to be govern'd by our passions, our wise directors permit them to govern us, and thereby give them a strength which we afterwards fruitlessly lament and oppose. To save our tears, we are to have our will; and, for a few moments of present quiet, be condemn'd to years of distress. Imaginary evils we are bid to regard as the principal real ones; and what we should most avoid, we are, by examples of greatest weight with us, encourag'd to practise.

How much, indeed, both the bodies and minds of Children suffer from the ill-inform'd understanding of their Parents, is scarcely to be conceiv'd——what advantages they lose by it——what misery they feel: and therefore, as they are the immediate objects of our care——as Nature has made them such, and all the prejudice they receive from any failure of ours, from any neglect on our part in qualifying ourselves to assist them in the way we ought to do it, is really an injury done them by us; we cannot think, that if we won't endeavour to have just notions of things, we are sufficiently punish'd by being without them——we can with no probability suppose, that,
if

if we are content to be losers ourselves, it will be satisfaction enough for any distress that our carelessness or supineness brings on others, even on them whose welfare we ought most to consult.

OF what advantage it is to both sexes, that *the Parent*, under whose guidance they are in their tender years, should not have confin'd her thoughts to the recommendations of apparel, furniture, equipage—to the amusements in fashion—to the forms of good breeding—to the low topics of female conversation; we have the most remarkable instances in the family of EMILIA. She has for many years been the wife of one, whose rank is the least part of his merit: made by him the mother of a numerous offspring, and having, from his important and uninterrupted avocations, their education left entirely to her, 'till they were qualified for a more extensive instruction; it was her study how she might be of the greatest use to them: they were ever under her eye: her attention to forming their manners could be diverted by none of the pleasures, by none of the engagements that claim so many of the hours of a woman of quality. She did not awe, but reason her children into their duty; they shew'd themselves to practise it not from

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constraint, but conviction. When they were absent from her—when they were in company, where they might have been as free as they pleased, I have, with astonishment, observed them as much influenced by what their wife Mother had advised, as they could have been by any thing she would have said, had she been then present. In her conversation with them she was perpetually inculcating useful truths; she talk'd them into more knowledge, by the time that they were six or seven years old, than is usually attain'd at, perhaps, twice that age.

LET me indulge my imagination, and, by its aid, give a sample of her instructions; first, to one of the females of her family, and then, to one of the males. LEONORA, her eldest daughter, has, among her many accomplishments, great skill in painting. When her Mother and she stood viewing the pictures, that crowded each side of the room in which they were, EMILIA desired to hear what the pupil of so eminent a master had to observe on the works before them. LEONORA began; praised the bold and animated manner in this piece, the softness and delicacy of that. Nothing could be more graceful than the attitude of this figure; the expression in that was so
happy

happy, the colouring so beautiful, that one might truly say of it *, To make it alive, speech alone is wanted; nor would you think even that wanting, were you to trust wholly to your eyes. Here she admired the skilful distribution of light and shade: there the perspective was so wonderfully exact, that in the great number of objects presented to the eye it could fix on none but what had its proper place, and just dimensions. How free is that drapery! what a variety is there in it, yet how well adjusted is the whole to the several figures in the piece? Does not that group extremely please your Ladyship? the disposition is quite fine, the association of the figures admirable; I know not which you could pitch upon to have absent or alter'd. LEONORA pursuing this strain, EMILIA interrupted her: Have we nothing, Child, but exactness here? Is every thing before us quite finished and faultless? You will be pleas'd, Madam, to reflect on what you have so often inculcated, That one would always chuse to be sparing in censure, and liberal of praise——That commendation,

* Manca il parlar, di vivo altro non chiedi;
Ne manca questo ancor, s'agli occhi credi.

Tasso Gierusalem liberat.

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freely bestow'd on what deserves it, credits as like our Temper and our Understanding.

THIS I would have you never forget. But I'm here a learner; in that light you are now to consider me; and as your French-master taught you pronunciation, not only by using a right, but by imitating your wrong one; making you by that means more sensible where the difference lay; so, to qualify me for a judge in painting, it will not suffice to tell me where the artist has succeeded, if you observe not, likewise, where he has miscarry'd.

LEONORA then proceeded to shew where the drawing was incorrect——the attitude ungraceful —— the *costume* ill preserv'd —— the ordonnance irregular —— the contours harsh —— the light too strong —— the shade too deep; extending her remarks in this way to a great number of pieces in the collection. You have been thus far, interpos'd EMILIA, my instructor, let me now be yours. Suppose your own portrait here. In the same manner that you would examine *it*, judge of the original. This *you* ought to do, since it will be done by *others*; and the more blemishes *you* discover, the fewer you will probably leave for *them* to reproach you with. The faults in the picture may be known to him who drew
it,

it, and yet be suffer'd to appear, from his inability to correct them; but when you discern what is faulty in yourself, if you cannot amend, you can, often, conceal it. Here you have the advantage of the painter; in another respect he has it greatly of you. Not one in a thousand is a judge of the *failures* in his performance; and therefore even when *many* may be objected to him, he shall pass, in common esteem, for an excellent artist. But let the woman, unconscious of her imperfections, be at no pains to remedy or hide them, all who converse with her are judges of them; when she permits them to be seen, they are sure to be censured.

You have sufficiently convinc'd me, to how many things the painter must attend—— against what various mistakes he has to guard: each of your criticisms on him may be a lesson to yourself; every blemish or beauty in any part of his works has something correspondent to it in human life.

THE Design is faulty, not only when the end we propose to ourselves is confessedly criminal, but when it is low and mean; when, likewise, we let our time pass at random, without any concern for what reason and duty require,

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require, but as caprice, or humour, or passion suggests.

WE offend against Proportion, when we arrogate to ourselves the desert we want, or over-rate what may be allow'd us——when we hate not what is really evil ; or when our affections are plac'd on what is not our proper good. You remember the dissection of a female heart in the *Spectator* ; I refer you to it, that I may spare my own reflections on what would furnish copious matter for no very pleasing ones.

YOUR Ladyship will pardon me for interrupting you ; but I can't help thinking, that the head and heart of a Beau, or Country 'Squire, would furnish as much folly and corruption, as the head and heart of any woman in the kingdom.

WE shall never, Child, become better, by thinking who are worse than ourselves. If the charge upon us be just, we should consider how to get clear of it, and not who are liable to one equally reproachful. Were I to bid you wash your face, would you think yourself justify'd in not doing it, because you could shew me a woman of rank with a dirtier ? But to the purpose.

That Expression, any failure in which you would, as a judge of painting, treat without mercy,

mercy, is, in Morals, violated by whatever is out of character, All inconsistency in practice——in profession and practice; every thing unbecoming your sex——your education——your capacity——your station, deserves the same censure that the pencil meets with, when it errs in Expression.

SKILL in the Distribution of light and shade, or the *clair-obscur*, as, I think, the term of art is, I should apprehend resembled by prudence; which teaches us to shew ourselves in the most advantageous point of view——brings forward and brightens our good qualities, but throws back and obscures our defects——suffers nothing to distinguish itself that will be to our disparagement, nor shades any thing that will credit us.

By *Ordonnance* is meant, I conceive, the manner of placing the several objects in a piece, or the disposition of them with respect to the whole composition. And what can be fitter for us, than to consider where we are, and to appear accordingly? The civilities that are less decently shewn in the Church, it would be a great indecorum to neglect in the drawing-room. The freedom that will gain you the hearts of your inferiors, shall, if used towards those of a higher rank, make you be thought

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thought the worst-bred woman in the world. Let the season for it be disregarded, your cheerfulness shall be offensive—your gravity seem ridiculous—your wit bring your sense into question, and your very friendliest interposition be thought not so much a proof of your affection, as of your impertinence. 'Tis the right placing of things that shews our discretion—that keeps us clear of difficulties—that raises our credit—that principally contributes to give any of our designs success.

To Beauty in colouring corresponds, perhaps, good nature improv'd by good breeding. And, certainly, as the canvass could furnish no design so well fancy'd, no draught so correct, but what would yet fail to please, and would even disgust you, were the colours of it ill-united—not sustain'd by each other—void of their due harmony: so both sense and virtue go but a little way in our recommendation, if they appear not to their proper advantage in an easiness of behaviour—in soft and gentle manners, and with all the graces of affability, courtesy and complaisance. I see, by your smiling, you are satisfy'd you can't be accus'd of being a bad colourist. Believe me, you have then gain'd a very material point; and the more concerns you have in the world,

world, the more proofs you will find of its importance. I'll drop this subject, when I have said to you, That if to make a good picture is such a complicated task, requires so much attention, such extensive observation——if an error in any of the principal parts of painting so offends, takes off so greatly from the merit of the piece——if he, who is truly an artist, overlooks nothing that would be at all a blemish to his performance, and would call each trivial indecorum, a fault; Think, Child, what care about the Original ought to equal this for the Portrait——of what infinitely greater consequence it must be, to have every thing right within ourselves, than to give a just appearance to the things without us; and how much less pardonably any violation of decorum would be charg'd on your life, than on your pencil.

THE most finish'd representation only pleases by its correspondence to what it represents, as Nature well imitated; and if justness in meer representation and imitation can have the charms you find in it, you may easily conceive the still greater delight that must arise from beholding the beauties of Nature itself; such, particularly, as the pencil cannot imitate——the beauties of rational Nature, those which
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the possessor gives herself—which are of ten thousand times the moment of any in her outward symmetry—which, how highly soever they may adorn her, profit her still more; and are not only to her own advantage, but to that of the age in which she lives, and, possibly, of remotest generations.

My concern to see you this fair unblemish'd Original makes me strangely unmindful on what topic I am got. There surely can be no proof wanting, how much a wise and good woman excels any portrait; or any woman, who has but the merit of a portrait, a fine appearance.

IN this way EMILIA takes each opportunity to form the manners of her Daughter—to give her throughout just and reasonable sentiments, and dispose her to the exact discharge of her duty in every relation.

LEONORA, thus educated, has the foibles and the follies of the age in their due contempt—judges wisely—acts prudently—is ever usefully or innocently employ'd—can pass her evenings very chearfully without a card in her hand—can be perfectly in humour when she is at home, and all her acquaintance at the assembly; and seems likely to borrow no credit from her family, which she will not fully repay.

WE

WE will dismiss the Daughter, and represent EMILIA parting with her Son in terms like these. I am now to take my leave of you, for one campaign at least. It is the first you ever serv'd; let me advise, and do you act, as if it would be your last: the dangers, to which you will be expos'd, give both of us reason to fear it: if it please God that it should be so, may you not be found unprepar'd, nor I unresign'd! This I am the less likely to be, when *you* have had *my* best counsel, and *I* *your* promise to reflect upon it. He bowing, and assuring her, that whatever she should be pleas'd to say to him, it would be carefully remembered; she proceeded—I could never conceive, what induc'd the Soldier to think that he might take greater liberties than the rest of mankind. He is, 'tis true, occasionally subjected to greater hardships, and he runs greater hazards; but by a lewd and vicious life, he makes these hardships abundantly more grievous than they otherwise would be—he disqualifies himself to bear them. What would you think of his wits, who, because he is to be much in the cold, sits, as often as he can, close to the fire? An habitual sobriety and regularity of manners is, certainly, the best preservative of that vigorous constitution, which makes it least un-

easy

easy to endure fatigue and cold, hunger and thirst.

THE dangers to which the Soldier is expos'd, are so far from excusing his licentiousness, when he has no enemy near him, that they ought to be consider'd as the strongest motive to conform himself, at all times, to the rules of reason and religion. A practice agreeable to them is the best support of his spirits, and the surest provision for his safety——It will effectually remove his fears, and can alone encourage his hopes: nothing but it can give him any comfortable expectation, if what threatens him should befall him. He who is so much in danger, ought to be properly *arm'd* against it, and this he can never be by reflecting on the women he has corrupted——on his hours of intemperance, or on any other of his extravagancies. You won't, perhaps, allow that he wants the *armour* I would provide him, because he never knows the apprehensions that require it. But I am considering what his apprehensions ought to be, not what they are. The nature of things will not be alter'd by our opinion about them.

IT is granted, that a Soldier's life is, frequently, in the utmost *hazard*; and the question is not, how a thoughtless, stupid, absurd creature

ture should behave in such a situation, but, what should be done in it by a man of prudence and sense? I say, he will attend to the value of what he *hazards*——to the consequence of its loss; and, if found of very great, he will so act, that the loss thereof may be, if possible, some or other way made up to him, or accompany'd with the fewest inconveniences. Insensibility of danger is the merit of a bull-dog. True courage sees danger, but despises it only from rational motives—from the considerations of duty. There can be no virtue in exposing life, where there is no notion of its value; you are a brave man, when you fully understand its worth, and yet, in a good cause, disregard death.

IF, thus, to be ready to die is commendable, wholly from the cause that makes us so, which is, unquestionably, the case; I don't see how such an indifference to life, when honour calls you to risk it, can consist with passing it, at any season, immorally and dissolutely.

HERE'S a gallant Officer, who will rather be kill'd than quit his post——than be wanting in the defence of his country! Is not this a fine resolution in one who, by his excesses, makes himself every day less able to serve his

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country ; or who sets an example, which, if follow'd, would do his country as much mischief, as it could have to fear from its most determin'd enemy.

THE inconsiderate and thoughtless may laugh at vice—may give soft terms to very bad actions, or speak of them, as if they were rather matter of jest than abhorrence : but whoever will reflect whence all the misery of mankind arises——what the source is of all the evils we lament ; he cannot but own, that if any thing ought to make us serious——if we ought to detest any thing, it should be *that*, from which such terrible effects are deriv'd.

FOR the very same reason that we prefer health to sickness——ease to pain, we must prefer virtue to vice. Moral evil seems to me to have a necessary connection with natural. According to my notion of things, there is no crime but what creates pain, or has a tendency to create it to others or ourselves : every criminal is such, by doing something that is directly, or in its consequences, hurtful to himself, or to a fellow-creature.

Is not here a foundation of Religion that no objections can affect ? Deprive us of it, you deprive us of the only effectual restraint from
those

those practices, which are most detrimental to the world—you deprive us of virtue, and thereby of all the true happiness we have here to expect.

To charge Religion with the mischief occasion'd by mistakes about it, I think full as impertinent, as to decry Reason for the wrong use that has been made of it; or Government, for the bad administration of *every kind of it, in every part of the world*. What shall prove to the advantage of mankind, will, *in all cases*, depend upon themselves: that which is, confessedly, most for it, in every instance you can think of, you see, occasionally, abus'd; and by that abuse becoming as hurtful, as it would, otherwise, have been beneficial. Controversy I hate; and to read books of it as ill suits my leisure, as my inclination: yet I do not profess a Religion, the grounds of which I have never consider'd. And upon the very same grounds that I am convinc'd of the truth of Religion in general, I am so of the truth of Christianity. The good of the world is greatly promoted by it. If we would take Christianity for our guide throughout, we could not have a better—we could not have a surer to all the happiness of which our present state admits. Its simplicity

may have been disguis'd——its intention perverted——its doctrines misrepresented, and conclusions drawn, suiting rather the interest or ambition of the Expofitor, than the directions of the Text : but when I resort to the Rule itself;—when I find it asserting, that the whole of my duty is to love God above all things, and my neighbour as my self——to live always mindful by whom I am sent into, and preserv'd in, the world, and always dispos'd to do in it the utmost good in my power ; I can no more doubt, whether this is the voice of my Creator, than I can doubt, whether it must be his will, that, when he has made me a reasonable creature, I should act like one. But I will drop a Topic, on which I am sure your Father must have sufficiently enlarg'd : I can only speak to it more generally ; *Difficulties* and *Objections* I must leave him to obviate ; yet thus much confidently affirming, that if you won't adopt an irreligious Scheme, till you find one clear of them, you will continue as good a Christian, as it has been our joint care to make you. I pray God you may do so. He that would corrupt your principles, is the enemy you have most to fear ; an enemy who means you worse, than any you will draw your sword against.

WHEN

WHEN you are told, that the Soldier's religion is his honour, observe the practice of them from whom you hear it; you'll soon then have proof enough, that they mean little more by honour, than what is requisite to keep or advance their commissions—that they are still in their own opinion men of nice honour, tho' abandon'd to the grossest sensuality and excess, tho' chargeable with acts of the foulest perfidy and injustice—that the honour by which they govern themselves differs as widely from what is truly such, as humour from reason. True honour is to virtue what good breeding is to good nature, the polishing, the refinement of it. And the more you think of Christianity, the more firmly you will be persuaded, that in its precepts *the strictest rules of honour* are contain'd. By these I, certainly, would have you always guided; and, on that very account, have reminded you of the Religion, which not only shews you them, but proposes the reward likeliest to attach you to them. I have done. Take care of yourself. You won't fly danger, don't court it. If the one would bring your courage into question, the other will your sense. The rash is as ill qualified for command, as the coward. May every blessing attend you! And to secure your

happinefs, live always attentive to your duty ; Reverence and obey him to whom you owe your Being, and from whom muft come whatever good you can hope for in it. Adieu. I can't fay it would fufficiently comfort me for your lofs, that you died with honour ; but it would infinitely lefs afflict me to hear of you among the dead, than among the profligate.

WHAT has been the iffue of instructions like thefe from both Parents ? SCIPIO, for fo we will call the worthy man, from the time he received his commiffion, has alike diftinguifh'd himfelf by his courage and conduct. The greateft dangers have not terrify'd, the worft examples have not corrupted him. He has approv'd himfelf difdaining by cowardice to keep *life*, and abhorring to fhorten *it*, by excefs : the bravery with which he has hazarded *it*, is equall'd by the prudence with which he paffes *it*.



ON THE
EMPLOYMENT *of* TIME.

ESSAY the SECOND.

Cùm animus, cognitis perceptisque virtutibus, à corporis obsequio, indulgentiaque discefferit, voluptatemque, sicut labem aliquam decoris opprefferit, omnemque mortis dolorisque timorem effugerit, societatemque caritatis coierit cum suis, omnesque naturâ conjunctos, suos duxerit, cultumque Deorum, & puram religionem susceperit—quid eo dici, aut excogitari poterit beatius?
Tull. de Legibus. l. i.



AMONG the Indians there is an excellent set of men, called Gymnosophists: these I greatly admire, not as skill'd in propagating the vine—in the arts of grafting or agriculture. They apply not themselves to till the ground—to search after gold—to break the horse—to

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to tame the bull—to shear or feed sheep or goats. What is it then that engages them? One thing preferable to all these. Wisdom is the pursuit as well of the old men, the teachers; as of the young, their disciples. Nor is there any thing among them that I so much praise, as their aversion to sloth and idleness.

When the tables are spread, before the meat is set on them, all the youth, assembling to their meal, are ask'd by their Masters—In what useful task they have been employ'd from sun-rising to that time? One represents himself as having been chosen an Arbitrator, and succeeded by his prudent management in composing a difference—in making them friends, who were at variance. A second had been paying obedience to his parents commands. A third had made some discovery by his own application, or learn'd something by another's instruction. The rest give an account of themselves in the same way.

He who has done nothing to deserve a dinner, is turn'd out of doors without one,

DIPPING INTO APULEIUS for my afternoon's amusement, the foregoing passage was the last I read, before I fell into a slumber; which exhibited to me a vast concourse of the fashionable people at the court-end of the Town, under
the

the examination of a Gymnosophist, How they had pass'd their morning? He begun with the men.

MANY of them acknowledg'd, that the morning, properly speaking, was near gone, before their eyes were open'd.

MANY of them had only risen to dress—to visit—to amuse themselves at the drawing-room or coffee-house.

SOME had by riding or walking been consulting that health at the beginning of the day, which the close of it would wholly pass in impairing.

SOME from the time they had got on their own cloaths, had been engag'd in seeing others put on theirs—in attending Levees—in endeavouring to procure by their importunity, what they had disqualify'd themselves for by their idleness.

SOME had been early out of their beds, but it was because they could not, from their ill luck the preceding evening, rest in them; and when risen, as they had no spirits, they could not reconcile themselves to any sort of application.

SOME had not had it in their power to do what was of much consequence: in the former part of the morning, they wanted to speak with

with their tradesmen; and in the latter, they could not be deny'd to their friends.

OTHERS, truly, had been reading, but reading what could make them neither wiser nor better, what was not worth their remembering, or what they should wish to forget.

It griev'd me to hear so many of eminent rank, both in the sea and land service, giving an account of themselves that levell'd them with the meanest under their command.

SEVERAL appear'd with an air expressing the fullest confidence that what they had to say for themselves would be to the Philosopher's entire satisfaction. They had been employ'd as Virtuosi should be—— had been exercising their skill in the liberal arts, and encouraging the Artists. Medals, Pictures, Statues had undergone their examination, and been their purchase. They had been inquiring what the Literati of *France, Germany, Italy*, had of late publish'd; and they had bought what suited their respective tastes.

WHEN it appear'd, That the compleating a *Roman* Series had been their concern, who had never read over, in his own language, a *Latin* historian——That they who grudg'd no expence for Originals, knew them only by
hearsay

hearſay from their worſt copies——* That the very perſons who had paid ſo much for the art of RYSBRACK, upon Sir ANDREW's *judgment*, would, if they had follow'd their *own*, have paid the ſame ſum for the labour of BIRD——That the book-buyers had not laid out their money on what they ever propos'd to read, but on what they had heard commended, and what they wanted to fit a ſhelf, and fill a Library, that only ſerv'd them for a breakfast-room; this claſs of men the Sage pronounc'd the idleſt of all idle people, and doubly blameable, as waſting alike their time and their fortune.

THE follies of one ſex had ſo tir'd the Philoſopher, that he would ſuffer no account to be given him of thoſe of the other. It was eaſy for him to gueſs how the Females muſt have been employ'd, where ſuch were the examples in thoſe they were to *honour and obey*.

FOR a ſhort ſpace there was a general ſilence. The Gymnoſophiſt at length expreſs'd himſelf to this effect. You have been repreſented to me as a people who would uſe your own reaſon——who would think for yourſelves——

* Parentibus, nec minùs fratribus præferunt (pueri) parvæ ære empta monilia. Quid ergo inter nos & illos intereſt, ut Ariſto ait, niſi quòd nos circa tabulas & ſtatuas inſanimus, *Cariùs inepti*. *Sen. Ep.* 115.

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who would freely inquire, form your opinions on evidence, and adopt no man's sentiments merely because they were his. A character, to which, for ought I can find, you are as ill entitled as, perhaps, most nations in the universe. The freedom with which great names are oppos'd, and receiv'd opinions question'd by *some* among you, is, probably, no other than what is us'd by *some* of every country in which liberal inquiries are pursu'd. The difference is, *you* safely publish your sentiments on every subject; to *them* it would be penal to avow any notions that agree not with those of their Superiors. But when you thus pass your days, as if you thought not at all, have you any pretence to freedom of thought? Can they be said to love Truth, who shun Consideration? When it seems your study to be useless, to be of no service to others or yourselves——when you treat your time as a burthen, to be eas'd of which is your whole concern——when that situation, those circumstances of life are accounted the happiest, which most tempt you to be idle and insignificant; human nature is as much dishonour'd by you, as it is by any of those people, whose savageness or superstition you have in the greatest contempt.

LET

LET me not be told, how well you approve your Reason by your arguments or your sentiments. The proper use of Reason, is to act reasonably. When you so grossly fail in this, all the just apprehensions you may entertain, all the right things you may say, only prove with what abilities you are form'd, and with what guilt you misapply them.

THE Sage here raising his arm with his voice, I concluded it adviseable not to stand quite so near him. In attempting to remove I awoke, and hastened to commit to writing a Dream that had so much truth in it, and therefore express'd how seasonable it will be to consider to what use of our time we are directed,

FIRST, By our present state and condition ;

SECONDLY, By the relation we bear to each other ;

THIRDLY, By that in which we stand towards the Deity.

* IF we are rais'd above the Brutes —— if we are undeniably of a more excellent kind, we

* Pertinet ad omnem officii quæstionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedit. Illæ nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu : hominis autem mens discendo alitur & cogitando. —— Si quis est paullo ad voluptates propensior, modò ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt

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we must be made for a different purpose ; we cannot have the faculties they want, but in order to a life different from theirs ; and when our life is not such——when it is but a round of eating, drinking, and sleeping, as theirs is——when, by our idleness and inattention, we are almost on a level with them, both as to all sense of duty and all useful knowledge that we possess, our time must have been grievously misemploy'd ; there is no surer token of its having been so, than that we have done so little to advance ourselves above the herd, when our Creator had vouchsaf'd us so far superior a capacity.

* The Creatures below us are wholly intent on the pleasures of Sense, because they are

(sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed nomine) sed, si quis est paulò erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat & dissimulat appetitum voluptatis, propter verecundiam: ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis præstantiâ, eamque contemni & rejici oportere.——Si considerare volumus, quæ sit in natura excellentia & dignitas, intelligemus quàm sit turpe diffuere luxuriâ, & delicatè ac molliter vivere, quamque honestum parcè, continenter, severè, sobriè. *Tull. de Off. l. i.*

* Τῆς ὁμῆς τοῖς ζῶσις ἐπιγενομένης, ἡ συγχρόμενα πορεύεται πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα, τέτοις μὲν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁμὴν διοικέσθαι. τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τοῖς λογικοῖς κατὰ τελειοτέραν προσασίαν δεδομένον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν ὁρθῶς γίνεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. *Diog. Laert. l. 7.*
Voluptatem

are capable of no other : but as man is capable of much higher and nobler, he must have this privilege, that his pursuits may be accordingly——that his better nature should be better employ'd.

WERE we born only to satisfy the appetites we have in common with the brute kind, we should, like it, have no higher Principle to direct us——to furnish us with other delights. All the distinction between us that this Principle *can* make, was, undoubtedly, intended by our Creator to *be* made ; and the less any appears, our abuse of this Principle, and consequently our opposition to our Maker's Will, is the more notorious and blameable.

IT may seem then plain, that there are advantages to be pursu'd, and a certain degree of excellence to be attain'd by us, according to the powers that we have, and the creatures below

Voluptatem bestiis concedamus, aliud aliquid hominis summum bonum reperiendum est——Nullo modo summum pecudis bonum & hominis, idem mihi videri potest. —— Ad altiora quædam, & magnificentiora nati sumus : nec id ex animi solum partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerabilium —— inest conjectura consequentium, non multum à divinatione differens, inest moderator cupiditatis pudor, inest ad humanam societatem justitiæ fida custodia : —— membra ipsa sensusque considera : qui tibi, ut reliquæ corporis partes, non comites solum virtutum, sed ministri etiam videbuntur. *Tull. de Fin. l. 2.*

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us want. * How industrious we should be to improve each opportunity for this, we may learn by attending, in the next place, to our *uncertain*, and, at all events, *short* continuance on earth.

† WE are fully appris'd, that by the pains of a few hours or days no progress can be made in any thing, that has the slightest pretence to commendation. Those accomplishments, that are confin'd to our fingers ends, what months, what years of application do they cost us! And, alas! what trifles are the most admir'd of them, in comparison of a great number of others for which we are qualify'd; and which, as they are so infinitely preferable to these, ought to be so much the more earnestly sought! When, therefore, the whole term allow'd for gaining and using them, is thus precarious and short ‡, we can have but a very small portion of it to dispose of as we please—to pass entirely as mere fancy or

* Non tam benignum ac liberale tempus natura nobis dedit, ut aliquid ex illo vacet perdere: et vide, quàm multa etiam diligentissimis pereant. *Sen. Ep. 117.*

† Unam quamlibet rem vix ad perfectum adducit assidua vigilia & intentio. *Sen. Ep. 69.*

‡ Ζήνων ἔλεγεν, ἔδεινός ἡμᾶς οὕτω πένεσθαι, ὥς χρόνον. Βραχύς γάρ ὄντως ὁ βίος, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρὴ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους ἰάσασθαι δυναμένη. *Stobæus.*

humour

humour * suggests. If much is to be done in a very short time, the good husbandry of it must be consulted; and there is no one, who considers what we, universally, may effect—in how many particulars we may be of service to ourselves—how much depends upon our endeavours—how necessary they are for our attaining what should be most valu'd by us, what is of greatest consequence to us; there is, I say, no one, who considers these things, but must admit, that we have much to do, and, therefore, that the scanty term we have for it ought to be carefully manag'd—can only by a prudent management suffice for the dispatch of such a task.

AND our opportunities, for making attainments thus desirable, should be so much the more diligently watch'd, and readily embrac'd, as they meet with many unavoidable interruptions even in our short life †.

How great a part of our time is *necessarily* lost to us—is consum'd by, that shorter

* Quatenus nobis denegatur diu vivere, relinquamus aliquid quo nos vixisse testemur. *Plin. Ep. 7. l. 3.*

† Cogita quantum temporis tibi auferat mala valetudo, quantum occupatio publica, quantum occupatio privata, quantum occupatio quotidiana, quantum somnus. *Metire ætatem tuam. Sen. Ep. 88.*

Death, our Sleep! * We are really better economists than ordinary in this instance, if only a third part of our Life thus passes: and on the rest of it what a large demand is made by our meals——by our justifiable recreations——by the forms and civilities, to which a proper correspondence with our fellow-creatures obliges us? Add to these necessary deductions, the many casual ones with which we all, unavoidably, meet; and it will soon appear, what an exceeding small part of our short continuance on earth, we have to bestow on such purposes of living, as alone can be of credit to us.

WE are further to reflect, that in the small part of our life, in which we can be employ'd like reasonable creatures, Opportunities, for doing what may be of greatest moment, do not always serve us; and with some of them, if lost, we never again meet.

WE depend very much on things without us, and over which we have no sort of command. There may be an extraordinary advantage derived to us from them; but, if the first offer of this be neglected, we may never have a second.

* *Æstimatione nocturnæ quietis, dimidio quisque spatium vitæ suæ vivit? Pars æqua morti similis exigitur, aut poenæ, nisi contigit quies. Plin. Hist. Nat. l. 7.*

NOR is it only the Dependence we have on things without us, that requires us so carefully to watch our opportunities; we have a still more awakening call, if possible, to this from within ourselves—from the restraints to which the exercise of our powers is subjected. We cannot use these when and as we please—we cannot chuse the time of life wherein to avail ourselves of our natural endowments, and to reap all the advantage design'd us in them.

WHEN we are in our youth, our Bodies easily receive whatever mien or motion can recommend us: where is the sound so difficult, which our tongue cannot be then taught to express? To what speed may our feet then be brought, and our hands to what dexterity? But if we are advanc'd to Manhood before the forming us in any of these ways is attempted, all endeavour after it will then either be quite fruitless, or, probably, less successful than it would have been in our earlier years; and whatever its success be, a much greater might have formerly been obtain'd with half the pains.

* THE very same is it with our understanding, with our will and our passions. There

* Ut corpora ad quosdam membrorum flexus formari, nisi tenera, non possunt; sic animos quoque ad pleraque duriores robur ipsum facit. *Quintet. Inst. Orat. l. i.*

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is a certain season when our minds may be enlarg'd——when a vast stock of useful truths may be acquir'd——when our passions will readily submit to the government of reason——when right principles may be so fix'd in us, as to influence every important action of our future lives: but the season for this extends neither to the whole, nor to any considerable length of our continuance upon earth; it is limited to a few years of our term; and, if throughout these we neglect it, error or ignorance is, according to the ordinary course of things, entail'd upon us. Our will becomes our law——our lusts gain a strength that we afterwards vainly oppose——wrong inclinations become so confirm'd in us, that they defeat all our endeavours to correct them.

II. LET me proceed to consider what directions are furnish'd us for the employment of our time, by the relation we bear to each other.

SOCIETY is manifestly upheld by a circulation of kindness*: we are all of us, in some way or other, wanting assistance, and, in like

* *Unum debet omnibus esse propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas uniuscujusque & universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiat, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. Tull. de Off. 1. 3.*

manner,

manner, qualified to give it. None are in a state of independency on their fellow-creatures. The most slenderly endow'd are not a mere burthen on their kind; even they can contribute their share to the common good, and may be to the political body, what those parts of us, in which we least pride ourselves, are to the natural, not greatly indeed its ornaments, but much for its real use.

WE learn what are justly our mutual claims, from this mutual dependency; that on its account, as well as for other reasons, our life is not to pass in a round of pleasure or idleness, or according to the suggestions of mere humour and fancy, or in sordid and selfish pursuits *.

THERE can be nothing more evidently my duty, than that I should return the kindness I receive——than that, if many are employ'd in promoting my interest, I should be as intent on furthering theirs.

† ALL men are by nature equal. Their common passions and affections, their common infirmities,

* *Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas diligenter & sanctè observanda est, quæ nos omnes omnibus miscet, & indicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani. Sen. Ep. 48.*

† *Eadem omnibus principia, eademque origo. Nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium, & artibus bonis*

infirmities, their common wants give such constant remembrances of this equality, even to them who are most dispos'd to forget it, that they cannot, with all their endeavours, render themselves wholly unmindful thereof — they cannot become *insensible*, how unwilling soever they may be to *consider*, that their debt is as large as their demands — that they owe to others, as much as they can reasonably expect from them.

BUT are all then upon a level—must those distinctions be thrown down, which, being the chief support of the order and peace of society, are such of its happiness; and which Nature herself may be judg'd to appoint, by the very dispositions and abilities with which she forms us, qualifying some for rule, and fitting some for subjection?

THAT, in many instances, we are all upon a level, none can deny, who regard the materials of our bodies—the diseases and pain to which we are subject—our entrance into the world—the means of preserving us in

aptius. Qui——nomina familiæ suæ longo ordine, ac multis stemmatum illigata flexuris, in parte prima ædium collocant, noti magis quàm nobiles sunt. Unus omnium parens——est, five per splendidos, five per fordidos gradus: ad hunc prima cujusque origo perducitur. *Sen. de Ben. l. 3.*

it—

it—the length of our continuance therein—our passage out of it. But then as it will not follow, that, because we are made of the same materials—are liable to the same accidents and end, we, therefore, are the same throughout; neither is it a just conclusion, that, because we are levell'd in our dependency, we should be so in our employments.

SUPERIORITY will remain—distinctions will be preserv'd, tho' all of us must serve each other, while that service is differently perform'd.

SUPERIORITY has no sort of connection with idleness and uselessness: it may exempt us from the bodily fatigue of our inferiors, from their confinement and hardships—it may entitle some to the deference and submission of those about them: but it by no means exempts any of us from all attention to the common good, from all endeavours to promote it—by no means does it entitle any of us to live, like so many drones, on the industry of others, to reap all the benefit we can from them, and be of none to them.

THE distinctions of Prince and Subject—noble and vulgar—rich and poor, consist not in this, that the one has a great deal to do, and the other nothing—that the one must

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be always busied, and the other may be always taking his pleasure, or enjoying his ease. No, in this they consist, that these several persons are differently *busied*——assist each other in different ways.

THE Sovereign acquaints himself with the true state of his kingdom——directs the execution of its laws——provides for the exact administration of Justice——secures the properties of his people——preserves their peace. These are his cares; and that they may be the more assured of success, and have their weight more easily supported, his commands find the readiest obedience——a large revenue is assigned him——the highest honours are paid him. It is not, in any of these instances, the Man who is regarded, but the Head of the community; and that for the benefit of the community——for the security of its quiet, and the furtherance of its prosperity *.

* *Mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda iis, qui præsunt aliis, ut ii, qui erunt eorum in imperio, sint beatissimi.*——Est autem non modo ejus, qui sociis & civibus, sed etiam ejus, qui servis, qui mutis pecudibus præsint, eorum, quibus præsint, commodis utilitatique servire. *Tull. Ep. ad Q. Frat. l. i. ep. i.*

Βασιλεὺς αἰρεῖται ὅχ' ἵνα ἑαυτὸν καλῶς ἐπιμελῇται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ ἡλόμενοι δι' αὐτὸν εὐπράττωσι. *Xen. de fact. & dict. Socr.*

THE

THE Nobility have it their task, to qualify themselves for executing the more honourable and important offices of the commonwealth, and to execute these offices with diligence and fidelity. The very station, to which they are advanc'd, is suppos'd either the recompence of great service done the public, or of the merit of an uncommon capacity to serve it.

THE richer members of the state, as they have all the helps that education can give them—as in their riper age they have all the opportunity they can wish for to improve upon these helps—as their circumstances exempt them from the temptations, to which poverty is expos'd; to them is committed the discharge of those Offices in the commonwealth, which are next to the highest, and sometimes even of these—they either concur in making Laws for the Society, or are chiefly concern'd in executing them—Commerce, Arts, Science, Liberty, Virtue, whatever can be for the credit and peace, for the ease and prosperity of a nation, depends on the part they act, on their conduct.

LET them be a supine, indolent race, averse to rational inquiries, to all serious application—let it be their business to divert themselves, to give a loose to fancy and appetite—let

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let all their schemes be those of self-indulgence, and their life a round of vanity and sensuality; sad must be the condition of the nation to which they belong! throughout it must be disorder and confusion——it must have the worst to fear from its more powerful neighbours.

AND as, in all countries, *they* who are distinguished by *their* rank or fortune, have *their* post, *their* duty, *their* task for the common good——as to discharge this requires many accomplishments, the attainment of which is matter of much attention and pains, requires an improv'd understanding, command of passions *, an integrity and resolution which only can be preserv'd by an habitual seriousness and reflection——as *they* cannot fail in *their* parts, cannot misemploy *their* leisure, and unfit themselves for, or be negligent in the service appointed *them*, but *their* country must suffer grievously in its most valuable interests; the diligence *they* should use, the little time *they* have to trifle away is evident: it is most evident under what obligations *they* are, not to abandon themselves to merely animal gratifications, and the pleasures of sense——to sloth and inactivity.

* In maxuma fortuna minuma licentia est. *Sallust.*
NOR

NOR is it only from the omission of what *they* ought to perform, that the public will in this case suffer, but from the example *they* set. An insensibility that they are to live to any useful purposes——a thoughtlessness of their having any thing to mind but their humour and liking——a gross carelessness how their days pass, cannot appear amongst those of higher rank, but the infection will spread itself among those of a lower; these will desire to be as lazy and worthless as their superiors——to have the same share of mirth and jollity——to be of as little consequence to the public.

THAT this will be the case, is as certain, as experience can make any thing. It has been, and is, every where, found, that where they, who have the wealth, and are therefore supposed, tho' very unreasonably, to have the sense of a nation, treat their time as of no account, only think of making it subservient to their excesses, their vanity, or their sports; the same wrong notions soon spread among their inferiors*.

THE

* Cupiditatibus Principum & vitiis infici solet tota civitas——Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes (quanquam est magnum hoc per se ipsum malum) quan-

tum

THE populace, indeed, cannot be quite so dissolute—— they cannot be so immers'd in sloth and sensuality, as the richer part of a nation, because their circumstances permit it not: their maintenance must cost them some care and pains, but they will take as little as they can——they will, as far as is in their power, have their fill of what their betters teach them to be the comforts of life, the enjoyments proper for reasonable creatures—— they cannot debauch themselves in the more elegant and expensive ways, but they will in those which suit their education and condition——they cannot be wholly useless, but if they make themselves of any service, it shall only be, because they are paid for it, because they cannot be supported without it.

AND how can we expect that things should be otherwise? It is not, upon the lowest com-

tum illud, quod permulti imitatores principum existunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescunque summi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuisse.——Nobilium vitâ, victuque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciosius de republica merentur vitiosi Principes, quod non solum vitia concipiunt ipsi, sed ea infundunt in civitatem: neque solum obsunt, quod ipsi corrumpuntur, sed etiam quod corrumpunt, plusque exemplo, quam peccato nocent. *Tull, de Legibus*, l. 3.

putation,

putation, one in a hundred who forms his manners upon the principles of Reason. Example, customary practice govern us. And, as they, who are more especially dependent upon others, have it taught them, from their very infancy, to respect those on whom they depend—to observe them—to be directed by them; no wonder that they should be fond of imitating them, as far as their situation admits; no wonder that they should copy their follies, since *that* they can do most easily, and *that* most suits their natural depravity.

BUT to him, whose Industry is his support, I would observe: He should not think, that, if they, who enjoy the plenty he wants, are prodigal of their time——misemploy it——waste it; *their* abuse of it will at all excuse *his*. He cannot possibly be ignorant how unfitting such a waste of time is——how much good it hinders——how much evil it occasions——and how much a greater sufferer he will be from it, than those who are in more plentiful circumstances.

AND let it be consider'd, by both high and low, rich and poor, that there can be nothing so becoming them*, there can be nothing that

* Quæ est melior in hominum genere natura, quam eorum, qui se natos ad homines juvandos, tutandos, conservandos arbitrantur? *Tull. Tusc. Quæst. l. 1.*

will

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will give them so solid, so lasting a satisfaction, as to be employ'd in serving mankind—— in furthering their happiness. What thought can we entertain more honourable, with respect to God himself, than that *his mercy is over all his works*——that his goodness is continually displaying itself through the whole extent of Being——that the unthankful and the evil he not only forbears †, but still seeks to awaken to a due acknowledgment of him, to a just sense of their true interest, by persevering in his kindness towards them, by continuing to them the blessings they so ill deserve?

AND if the consideration of the universal Creator, as thus acting, be really that which makes him appear most amiable to us—— which affects us with the most profound veneration of him, and chiefly renders it pleasing to us to contemplate his other perfections, what worth do we evidence, how highly do we recommend ourselves, when employ'd either in qualifying ourselves for doing good, or in doing it *,—— when we have the common

† Οἱ θεοὶ, ἀθάνατοι ὄντες, οὐ δυσχεραίνουσιν ὅτι ἐν τοσούτῳ αἰῶνι δέξοι αὐτοὺς πάντως αἱ τοιούτων ὄντων καὶ τοσούτων φαύλων ἀνέχασθαι· προσέτι δὲ καὶ κηδοναὶ αὐτῶν παντοίως. Anton. de rebus suis. l. 7.

* Βραχύς ὁ βίος· εἰς καρπὸς τῆς ἐπιγείης ζωῆς, διάδοσις ὅσια, καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαί.

advantage our constant pursuit——when we seek for pleasure † in making ourselves of use, and feel happiness in the degree in which we communicate it?

III. WHAT employment of our time the relation in which we stand to God suggests to us, I am next to shew.

EVERY one who reads this, I may justly suppose sensible that there is a nature superior to his own ‡, and even possess'd of the highest excellencies——that to it we owe our existence, owe the endowments, which place us at the head of all the creatures upon earth, owe whatever can make us desire to have our existence continu'd to us——that by this superior nature *alone*, many of our wants can be supply'd——that on it we entirely depend——that from its favour the whole of our increasing happiness can be expected *.

FROM

† Non potest quisquam beatè degere, qui se tantum intuetur. *Sen. Ep.* 48.

‡ Nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quæ non, etiam si ignoret, qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. *Tull. de Leg.* l. i.

Cœlestem admirabilem ordinem, incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio, & salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipse mentis expers habendus est. *Tull. de nat. Deor.* l. 2.

* Sit hoc à principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium

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FROM what we thus know of God and ourselves, there must arise certain Duties towards him, the performance of which will have its demand on our time*. His perfections require our highest veneration; this cannot be exercis'd or preserv'd without our serious attention to and recollection of them. His mercies demand our most humble and grateful acknowledgments; proper acts of thanksgiving are therefore what we should be blameable to omit; they daily become us, and should be made with all the solemnity and fervor, that suit the kindness vouchsaf'd us, and the majesty of him to whom we address ourselves.

† A due sense of our weakness and wants is a
constant

omnium rerum, ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum gerî vi, ditione, ac numine, eisdemque optimè de genere hominûm mereri, & qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate colat religiones, intueri: piorumque, & impiorum habere rationem. *Tull. de Leg. l. 2.*

* Παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται τὰς θεὰς σέβειν. *Xen. de fact. & dict. Socr.*

† Ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀρεῖται τιμᾶσθαι τὰς θεὰς. *Aristot. de Repub.*
Οἱ ἀποροῦντες, ὥστερον δὲ τὰς θεὰς τιμᾶν καὶ τὰς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ ἐ, κολάσεως δεοῦνται. *Aristot. Topic.*

† Πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος, θεὸν αἰεὶ περὶ καλοῦσιν. *Plat. Tim.*

Εφ' ᾧ πᾶσι θεὸς ἐπικαλοῦ. *M. Anton. de rebus suis.*

Never

constant admonition to us to look up to that Being whose power and goodness are infinite, and to cherish such dispositions as are most likely to recommend us to him: hence it is evident what stress we should lay upon those awful invocations of the divine interposition in our favour, and upon that devout confession of our unworthiness of it, which have a natural tendency to keep the Deity present to our remembrance, and to purify our hearts.

Never to acknowledge the enjoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to *deny* that we receive them from him; not to apply to him for a supply of our wants, is to *deny*, either our wants, or his power of helping us. *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 121.

If I should never pray to God, or worship him at all, such a total omission would be equivalent to this assertion, There is no God, who governs the world, to be ador'd; which, if there is such a Being, must be contrary to truth. Also *generally* and *notoriously* to neglect this duty, tho' not always, will favour, if not directly proclaim, the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner, is only to worship him accidentally; which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipped at all, and this approaches as near as possible to a *total* neglect. Besides, such a sparing and infrequent worshipper of the Deity, betrays such an habitual disregard of him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null. *Ibid.* p. 18.

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* **PUBLIC** acknowledgments of the goodness of God, and application for his blessings, contribute to give a whole community suitable apprehensions of him ; and these, if it be my Duty to entertain, it is equally my duty to propagate ; both as the regard I pay the divine excellencies is hereby fitly express'd, and as the same advantage, that I receive from such apprehensions, will be receiv'd by all whom they affect in the same manner with me. Hence it is clearly our duty to join in the public worship—to promote, by our regular attendance upon it, a like regularity in others.

THESE observations will, I hope, be thought sufficient proofs, that, from the relation we bear to God, a certain portion of our time is his claim——ought to be set apart for meditation upon him, for prayer to him, and for such other exercise of our reason as more immediately respects him, and suits our obligations towards him.

* Τιμὰ τὸ δαιμόνιον αἰεὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως. Ἰσοκ.
ad Dem.

**ON THE
EMPLOYMENT of TIME.**

ESSAY the THIRD.

Εγὼ ὑπὸ τέτων τῶν λόγων πείσμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανῶμαι
τῷ κρείττῳ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν. Χαίρειν ἔν ἐάσας τὰς τι-
μας τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι
τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστον εἶναι, καὶ ζῆναι, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποδῆσκειν,
ἀποδῆσκειν. Plat. Gorg.



SINCE all things are uncertain,
'favour yourself.' Where have I
met with it? Whosoever the ad-
vice is, it proceeds upon a suppo-
sition absolutely false, That there is an uncer-
tainty in all things : And were the supposition
true, the inference would be wrong ; did we
allow, that there was such an uncertainty in
all things, it would be wrongly concluded from
thence, that we should favour selves.

FIRST, There is not the uncertainty here
suppos'd. ‡ With regard to those things, which
call

‡ Non solum quatuor articuli supra memorati semper
stetere, nempe, 1. *Esse Deum summum* : 2. *coli debere* : 3.
virtutem esse præcipuam cultus divini partem : 4. *resipiscendum*
esse à peccatis : sed & hic ultimus, *dari præmium & pœnam,*

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call us to thoughts very different from that of *favouring* ourselves — which should withdraw our attention from our own will, our own liking — which suggest to us quite other considerations than of taking our ease, and indulging our appetites — which should make the animal life the least of our concern — which should render us only solicitous to purify ourselves, and be useful to our fellow-creatures ; with regard to these things, I say, we have either absolute certainty, or the highest degree of probability.

* To have produc'd so much beauty and order, as every where discover themselves, not only intelligence was *requisite*, but great wisdom and power.

† The beneficial effects naturally resulting *tum in hac vita, tum post hanc vitam, stetit, in æternumque stabit.* — *Hæc Providentiæ divinæ universalis castæque Religionis sunt firmamenta illa, quæ nullo defuere vel deesse possunt seculo vel regioni.* Herb. de Relig. Gent.

* Mundi administratio nihil habet in se quod reprehendi possit, ex iis enim naturis, quæ erant, quod effici potuit optimum, effectum est. Doceat ergo aliquis potuisse melius. Sed nemo umquam docebit : & si quis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius facit, aut id, quod fieri non potuit, desiderabit. *De Nat. Deor.* l. 2.

† Omni ratione concluditur, mente, consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem omnium conservationemque admirabiliter administrari. *Ibid.*

Omnes mundi partes ita constitutæ sunt, ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint esse, neque ad speciem pulchriores. *Ibid.*
from

from the things thus beautifully form'd and orderly dispos'd, *demonstrate* the goodness, as well as the wisdom and power of their author.

THAT the benefits he design'd, should constantly take place, *must*, as he is a good being, *be agreeable to his will*; and whatever hinders their taking effect, *must be disagreeable to it*.

WE cannot have a surer mark of what pleases him, than its being productive of happiness? and whatever has misery accompanying it, *carries with it the clearest proof* of its displeasing him.

† A VIRTUOUS practice, greatly furthering the happiness of mankind, *must be pleasing to their Maker*; a vicious one *must displease him*, as it necessarily obstructs their happiness.

IF from any accidental indisposition of things, as from the number of the criminal, virtue should *here* miss its reward, there is *great likelihood* that it will *elsewhere* receive it; and, if vice, by a like accident, should, in particular instances, not carry with it those marks of its offending the Governor of the world, which it in most cases bears, there is the *highest probability* that it will have its punishment in some

† Omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam. Acad. Quæst. l. 1.

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future state. There is that probability in favour of *virtue*, not only from what our reasonings on the justice and goodness of God induce us to think *it* has to expect from him, but also from the visible manner in which he signifies his approbation of *it*. He has impress'd a sense of *its* worth on the minds of all mankind—he has made satisfaction inseparable from a conformity to *it*——* he has appointed many advantages, in the ordinary course of things, *its* attendants; which seem concurring assurances, that to whatsoever disadvantages *it* may now, occasionally, expose us, they will be at length fully recompens'd. And there is the *probability* I have mention'd, that the guilty will not be always without a punishment adequate to their crimes, not only from the apprehensions we may fitly entertain of a just Governor of the universe; but, also, from the manner in which he, to the notice of all men, expresses his abhorrence of vice: annexing to

* Ὁρῶ—— τοὺς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ζῶντας, ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι χρόνοις ἀσφαλῶς διάγοντας, καὶ περὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἰδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντας. *Iloc. Orat. de permut.*

Ἐκείνη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς. *Arist. de repub. l. 7.*

Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. *Ib.*

Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν φιλοπονεῖν, καὶ σωφρόνως τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον οἰκονομεῖν, αἰετὰς τέρψεις εἰλικρινεῖς, καὶ βεβαιότερας ἀποδίδουσι. *Iloc. ad Demoniac.*

many

many crimes immediate inconveniencies—— giving *others* a very short respite from the severest distress, the painfullest diseases——allowing *none* to have our reason and conscience on their side, to be approv'd by us in our hours of seriousness and calm reflection †.

VIRTUE is, *evidently*, preserv'd and promoted by frequent consideration——by diligence and application——by the denial of our appetites——by the restraint of our inclinations——by a constant watchfulness over our passions——by cherishing in ourselves sentiments of humanity and benevolence. Vice is, as *manifestly*, produc'd and confirm'd by inattention——by supineness and carelessness——by favouring our appetites——by consulting rather what we are dispos'd to, than what is best for us, rather what inclination, than what reason suggests——by an attachment to the satisfaction of the present moment, to our immediate profit or convenience——by adopting narrow, selfish principles.

Thus it will appear, that there is by no means an uncertainty in all things, Most cer-

† Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat. *Sen. Ep. 94.*

Ζητοῦσι οἱ μοχθηροὶ μὲθ' ὧν συμμερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγου-
σιν——σασιάζει αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ——Μεταμελείας οἱ φαῦλοι γίμου-
σιν. *Aristot. Ethic.*

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tain it is from whence Virtue has its security and improvement. Equally certain is it how we become bad, and how we are made worse. Virtue has, in the nature of things, a reward of which it cannot be deprived, and vice as sure a punishment. All those accidents which obstruct either the advantages suiting a virtuous practice, or the sufferings that a vicious one ought to feel, may *fitly* carry our thoughts to some future state, when each will have its full desert from that Being, who has so clearly express'd as well his approbation of Virtue, as his abhorrence of Vice; and whose goodness, wisdom and power, as they admit of *demonstration*, so *they cannot but be believ'd* to concur in bestowing those rewards and punishments, which will be most for the welfare of the noblest part of the creation, the intelligent part of it.

BUT if there were the uncertainty that is not; the right consequence would not be, Favour yourself: it would be, Secure yourself: Provide against the worst; Let your present enjoyments be directed by the influence they may have on your future happiness: Consider the whole possible extent of your existence, and forego the satisfaction of a few moments, rather

ther than hazard the loss of a good that may continue for endless ages.

SUCH seem the proper inferences in this case; and the security of ourselves is very unlikely to be effected by favouring ourselves: the result of this, in a remoter period, may, with the highest degree of probability, be conjectur'd from what is, every day, experienc'd.

‡ BEAR and forbear, is the lesson for him who merely seeks to give his present life all the comfort in his power. Great inconveniences we cannot even here avoid, but by submitting to lesser.

FREEDOM from pain is the price of the enjoyments we deny ourselves; and strength of body purchas'd by the exercise that so severely fatigues it.

To what sleepless nights would he be condemn'd, whose ease throughout the day was to have no interruption? How little relish should we have of our food, were we to know nothing of the disquiet of hunger? The man who would most taste the gratifications of

‡ Epictetus solitus est dicere — Si quis hæc duo verba, ἀνίχῃ καὶ ἀπίχῃ, cordi habeat, eaque sibi imperando atque observando curet: is erit pleraque impeccabilis, vitamque vivet tranquillissimam. *Aul. Gell.*

sense,

sense, must be the most sparing in his application to them; *thence it is* they not only are heighten'd, but continu'd to us. It seems the condition of our being, that we should have no pleasure *gratis*—that we should pay for each, before or after its enjoyment. To decline whatever we could be less pleas'd with, is the surest way to increase both the number of our sufferings, and their weight.

WHAT can be more precarious than the continuance of human life? Who in his twentieth year acknowledges not, how uncertain it is whether he shall see his fortieth? Yet no one of common prudence seeks barely to crowd as much satisfaction into his life, as can consist with his reaching that period: there is no prudent man but denies himself many things, in hopes of attaining a much longer term.

WE must unusually fail in the love of our children, if we would not pursue their welfare, in the same way by which we judge our own best consulted. But where is the advocate for "Favour yourself since all things are uncertain," who, if discretion makes any part of his character, governs himself by that principle in their education—who does not restrain them in a thousand instances? while yet the uneasiness it gives, and the tears it costs them, may

may probably never find that very small recompence, which must be the utmost he can propose from it. I say, this recompence may, *probably*, never be found; a late eminent Mathematician † having, upon an exact calculation, observ'd, that one half of those that are born, are dead in seventeen years time.

SOME claim to a public spirit, to a love of their country we find made by the generality of us, even in this very profligate age. But from him, whose rule it is to favour himself, the public can have nothing to expect †. Were this the prevailing principle among us, 'tis obvious how little regard would be shewn to the common welfare.

ALL of the learned professions would regulate their application, by its subserviency to their maintenance, and think they had nothing so much to study, as how to make their fortune.

SOLDIER and Sailer would have no notion of any honour distinct from their advantage—

† Dr Hally. See *Lowthorp's Abridgment of the Philosophical Transactions*. vol. 3d.

† In iis adolescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus, & magnam indolem, quos suis commodis inservituros, & quidquid ipsis expediat, facturos arbitramur? Nonne videmus, quanta perturbatio rerum omnium consequatur? quanta confusio? *Tull. de Fin.* l. 2.

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of any obligation they could be under, when their pay might be safe, to endanger their persons.

THE people would judge none so fit to represent them, as they who had been at the greatest expence in corrupting them: and the representatives of the people would see no reason why the whole of what was to be gained should go to their constituents.

In short, nothing but supineness and sloth——an attachment to their ease and the gratification of their senses——low, unmanly views——pursuits throughout the most selfish and sordid would prevail, among all orders and degrees of men in any country, where the receiv'd doctrine was, *Favour yourself*.

HENCE certainly is it, that not only the better constituted governments, but even the nations of a less refin'd policy, have encourag'd so much an indifference to the scanty portion of life here allotted us——to the continuance, the ease, the conveniencies of it; exciting, by various methods, each member of the community, to have chiefly at heart the public interest——to be ever diligent and active in promoting it——to submit to any difficulties for the service of his country, and to despise death in its defence.

NOR

NOR do we, universally, esteem any characters more, than those of the persons who have distinguish'd themselves by their disinterestedness——by their zeal for the common good——by their slighting all private advantages that came in competition with it.

WHAT has been the language of the more generous Heathen, but the very reverse of *Favour thyself*? PLATO advises his friend ARCHYTAS to consider “ that we are not born for ourselves
“ alone——that our country, our parents, our
“ friends have their respective claims upon us.”
Epist. ix. p. 358. vol. 3.

ARISTOTLE, in settling the true difference between the lawful and culpable love of ourselves, observes, that such love of ourselves, is, undoubtedly, blameable, as induces us to seek as large a share as may be, of wealth, honour and sensual pleasure. He, afterwards, considers a life of reason and virtue, as the proper life of a Man, and pronounces him the true lover of himself, who makes such a life his care.

HE goes on, “ When all are intent on the
“ practice of what is right, and each lays
“ himself out on the worthiest actions, the
“ public welfare will, thereby, be effectually
“ provided for, and every private person con-
“ sult

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“sult his own greatest happiness. It is most
 “truly said of the good man, that he will
 “serve his friends and his country——will
 “do it, even at the expence of his life. For,
 “as to wealth, honour, and all those other
 “goods about which there is so much stir in
 “the world, he will have *no* regard to them,
 “when they come into competition with the
 “discharge of his duty. He will rather chuse
 “to live one year well, than many at ran-
 “dom. He is justly thought the good man,
 “who has nothing so much at heart, as how
 “to act rightly.”

To mention another *Greek* writer;

WE are born, says the excellent Emperor
 ANTONINUS, to assist each other, l. ii. §. 1.
 His counsel is, “Whatsoever you do, do it
 “with a view to your being a good man;
 “good, not in the ordinary, but in the strict
 “and proper sense of the word,” l. iv. §. 10.
 “In this delight, in this repose yourself, in
 “passing from one useful action to another;
 “still mindful of the Deity.” l. vi. §. 7.

“Whatsoever I do, says he, by myself, or
 “the assistance of others, ought wholly to be
 “directed by what the common advantage
 “requires.” l. vii. §. 5.

He

HE, elsewhere, censures every action of ours, that has no reference either immediately, or more remotely, to the duties of social life. l. ix. §. 23. To despise, says TULLY, and make no account of pleasure, life, wealth, in comparison of the public welfare, is the part of a great and generous mind.—A life of toil and trouble in order to promote, if possible, the good of all mankind, would be much more agreeable to nature, than to pass one's days in solitude, not only without any care, but enjoying the greatest pleasures, and having every thing that could be wanted at command. *De Off.* l. iii. 283, 284.

WE are all, according to SENECA, members of one great body, *Ep.* 95. We must consult the happiness of others, if we would our own. In his *Treatise of a Happy Life*, mentioning what the man must be, who may hope to pass hence to the abodes of the celestial Beings, part of his description of him is, “ That
“ he lives as if he knew himself born for
“ others——consults in all he does the ap-
“ probation of his conscience——regulates
“ his every action by considering it as well
“ known to the public, as it is to himself——
“ treats the whole world as his country——
“ regards the Gods as present wherever he
“ is,

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“ is, and as remarking whatever he acts and
“ speaks.”

TRUE happiness is, throughout this Author’s works, consider’d as deriv’d from Virtue—— from the steady pursuit of what is right and our duty.

THESE Reflections will, I hope, appear not improperly introducing the consideration of the part we have to act as expectants of happiness in a future state ; the subject of the following Essay.

THIS expectation does not indeed furnish any employment of our time that would not be comprehended under the heads on which I have already enlarg’d ; but it is the strongest possible enforcement of what they teach us.

CAN I suppose that beyond the grave there is any happiness prepar’d for me, if I live unmindful of the Privileges here vouchsaf’d me——if, when I’m plac’d above the beasts, I will put myself upon a level with them——if that spiritual part of me *, which makes me

* Si, ut antiquis *philosophis*, hisque *maximis*, longéque *clarissimis* placuit, æternos animos, ac divinos habemus : sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in cursu, id est, in ratione & investigandi cupiditate, & quo minùs se admiscuerint, atque implicuerint hominum vitiis atque erroribus, hoc illis faciliorem adscensum, & reditum in cœlum fore. *Tull. Fragm.*

a fit subject for this happiness, be neglected, and all my care and pains laid out on my body, on what was earth so lately, and must so speedily be earth again?

ARE there certain Dispositions which prepare us for, and which, by being perfected, probably constitute the happiness of another life; and may we hope to obtain it, when our pursuits contribute to suppress these Dispositions, or when we are wholly regardless of cultivating them? *

WHATEVER I hope for in a future abode, I ought to think the reward of something here done by me; and when the time for action here is so short, even in its longest continuance——when likewise our opportunities are so few, and so irrecoverably lost; we must conclude it most fitting, in order to the success of our hopes, to embrace the opportunity before us; not to neglect it from a presumption of finding others which perhaps may never come, or, if they do come, may be less favourable to us than the present; but to de-

* Nec enim omnibus iisdem illis sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiis & sce-
ribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in cœno
jacere docuerunt. *Tull. Fragm.*

rive from this every advantage it is capable of yielding us.

FURTHER, if according to the greater or less use of which we make ourselves to our fellow-creatures, we more or less answer the end of our Creation; we must conceive this to be a Point, our special regard to which will be the necessary consequence of the views we have beyond the grave. The bliss we then promise ourselves cannot be thought a likelier reward of any practice, than of that which aims at the most extensive good; nor can one of common sense think such happiness likely to be our portion, after a life spent as unprofitably, as that of those creatures, the whole of whose satisfactions we all confine to those they at present enjoy——to their present existence. Hence our hopes after Death will be perpetually urging us to what we can do most for the good of mankind, and must be a motive to it of the greatest weight.

THUS, likewise, when I contemplate a more desirable state of being, than what I am now placed in, awaiting me at my departure hence; as it is impossible that I should not at the same time take into my consideration, to whom I must owe this blessing, from whom alone it
can

can be receiv'd ; I must hereby be necessarily led to a great desire of pleasing him from whom it is to come ; and therefore to all such application to him, and acknowledgment of his excellencies, as can be suppos'd due from and requir'd of me.

To all the several tasks I have mention'd, we are thus particularly directed by attending to the happiness reserv'd for us ; the consideration of it thus strongly enforces their performance.

How far it must in general contribute to the best employment of our time, the following Observations may, I hope, fully convince us.

* IF we survey the things, on the value of which we are universally agreed, we shall perceive few, if any, of them obtain'd or secur'd without more or less care on our part, and some of them only the recompence of our painfullest endeavours. The long enjoyment of health is in vain expected, if we wholly decline the fatigue of Exercise, and the uneasiness of self-

* Τῶν πόνων πολλῶν ἡμῖν πάντα τ' ἀγαθὰ θεοί. Epichar.

Τῶν ὀνίων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ὅθεν ἄνευ πόνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδασιν ἀνθρώποις. Xen. de fact. & dict. Socr.

Προῖκα ὅθεν παραγίνεται. Epictet.

denial. The greatest estate must at length be wasted by him, who will be at no trouble in the management of it, who cannot torment his brains with examining accounts, and regulating the various articles of a large expence. Whose power is so establish'd, that the preservation of it costs him not much solicitude—many anxious thoughts; and compells him not to mortify himself in numerous instances? This is the case of them whom *we esteem* the most fortunate of their kind. As to the generality, how difficult do they find the acquisition of the meanest of these advantages? What years of diligence does it cost them to raise but a moderate fortune? Vast numbers we find struggling throughout their lives for a bare support.

THE chief blessings of life—the goods most worthy our pursuit, are not only *for the most part*, but *altogether*, the fruits of long and unweary'd endeavours after them. Where is the very useful art that can be learn'd without a close and tedious application — that we can make any tolerable progress in, before many of our days are pass'd? How much, and what an attentive experience — what repeated observations, and how exact a reasoning

soning upon them, are necessary to form us to any degree of wisdom? Duely to regulate our passions —— to have them under command, rightly directed, and more or less warm, proportionably to the influence their object has upon our happiness, will cost us, as every one is sensible *, a watchfulness and care of such continuance, as is submitted to by few even of those, who best know how far it would be overpaid by the good that it purchases.

If then we pay so dear for every satisfaction we now enjoy —— if there be nothing desirable on earth but what has its price of labour set upon it, and what is most desirable comes to us by the most labour; who in his wits can believe that happiness, far exceeding the utmost in our present state, will at length be our portion without any solicitude we need be at about it † —— without any qualifications we have to acquire in order to it —— without any pains we are to take after it? Nothing in Paganism or *Mohammedism*, nothing in *Popery* is so absurd as this supposition.

* Χαλεπόν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. Diog. Laert.

† Ἔργον ἐπὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. Arist. Ethic.

† Ne illi falsi sunt, qui divorsissimas res pariter expectant, ignaviae voluptatem, & præmia virtutis. *Salust. Jugurth.*

THERE is an uniformity in all the proceedings of God. As they are all grounded on an unerring wisdom, they must testify their correspondence to *it*, by what they have to *each other* : and so we find they do in all cases wherein we can fathom them. We know not, indeed, *in what way* we are to be made happy in another life ; but *with what* our being so is connected——*on what* it must depend, we are sufficiently instructed. The means of making ourselves thus happy, which are put in our power, plainly teach, that by *their* use it must be effected. Lesser goods, deriv'd to us only by our care and industry, demonstrate how we are to secure greater. The chief blessings, that are now within our reach, being never vouchsaf'd but to our extraordinary efforts——to our most earnest endeavours to gain them, lead us to the fullest conviction, That the same must be the condition of whatever enjoyments we can promise ourselves after our death——that they will only be the reward of the diligence with which they have been sought——of the difficulties their pursuit has occasion'd us *.

* L'Esprit de la Religion est de nous porter à faire avec effort des choses grandes & difficiles. *De l'Esprit des Loix.*

THE Atheist himself—he, who, having no views beyond this world, gives his lusts their full range in it, acts with abundantly more sense and consistency, than he, who, full of the hopes of immortality, yet consults his humour or his ease, his pleasure or his profit, regardless of any understanding he has to improve, or any progress in virtue he has to make. Nor is there any thing that so much confirms the irreligious man in his bad principles, as his observing this conduct in them, who profess to believe a God and another life. He thinks, and, I must own, but too justly, that it is the same thing, not to be influenc'd by such a belief, and not to have it ——— that it is even much more reasonable to give up all expectations of future happiness, than to expect it, and yet do nothing in order to it, do nothing that can appear at all qualifying us for, or entitling us to it: in a word, he rightly thinks that, supposing there be a God of that perfect justice and wisdom which he is represented, he cannot make any difference hereafter between them, who have absolutely denied his Justice——his Wisdom——nay his very Being, and them, who, with all their acknowledgments of him and his perfections,

would yet never sacrifice any of their inclinations to him——would not be at any pains to know his will, or, if they did know it, would only so far obey it, as it was agreeable to their own.

I HARDLY can quit this Subject. So great is the danger——so certain, I may say, is the mischief of persuading ourselves, that an eternal happiness will recompense the little we do to secure it, that I scarcely know when I have said enough to evince what conduct alone it can reward.

As the visible world is the only universal guide to our conjectures on the invisible, and therein, as I have observ'd, the method of Providence in dispensing its blessings, is manifest to every eye; all those which can most engage our wishes depending wholly on what we do to obtain them: as, likewise, whether we consider the wisdom of God, or his truth, or his justice, they all concur in teaching us this lesson, that an ever-continuing felicity can only be prepar'd for a distinguish'd virtue: As things, I say, are thus; may it not properly be ask'd, What can it be that so strangely infatuates us——that possesses us with hopes so extravagantly absurd——that makes a pursuit

suit so lazy and remiss, which ought to be so vigorous and uninterrupted? I know not what this possibly can be, but, either, the Numbers that countenance our practice, or, the Reliance we have on the Deity's unbounded Goodness.

As to the former, how little stress we should lay on numbers, will be evident from these four considerations.

FIRST, * They, who in every age, are most commended for their wisdom and prudence, never take the multitude for their pattern; but, on the other hand, constantly live in a direct opposition to its practices, and dissuade all, to whom they are well-wishers, from them.

SECONDLY, Those follies and vices, which are the reproach of numbers, are not, therefore, the less mischievous in their consequences. The increasing multitudes of the lewd and drunken do not, in any instance, occasion lewdness and drunkenness to have more favourable

* Nunquam volui populo placere.——Quis hoc? inquis: Epicurus. Sed idem hoc omnes tibi ex omni dono conclamabunt, Peripatetici, Academici, Stoici, Cynici. Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? *Sen. Ep. 29.*

Est philosophia paucis contenta iudiciis, multitudinem consultò fugiens. *Tull. Tusc. Quæst. l. 2.*

circum-

circumstances attending them, either with respect to the persons; or the posterity of the guilty: and if God be, in no instance, more favourable to the vicious in this world, because of their numbers; we have hence too sad a proof that they have not the least ground to expect he should be so in the next.

THIRDLY, What we call great numbers, are, probably, in respect of the whole creation of rational Beings, extremely few; perhaps no more than some few grains of sand, in comparison of those amazing heaps that spread the deserts of the earth, and shores of the ocean. Supposing, therefore, all offenders among the human kind, punish'd by God according to their deserts; that punishment might be making examples of a very small, of the very smallest part of his creatures, for the good of the rest——for preserving innumerable millions——an infinite race in their due obedience.

FOURTHLY, An establish'd order taking place in all the works of God that we are acquainted with; every thing in the natural world being subjected to certain laws; and in the moral world, Good having still a tendency to produce Good, nor ever failing to do it, unless from some accidental hindrances; and Evil,
when

when things are in their proper course, producing Evil; we have very strong reason to believe, that an unchangeable God — he whose wisdom uniformly displays itself, has fix'd things thus, that thus they will proceed to all Eternity; Good following from Good, Evil from Evil; with this difference alone, with respect to us, in another state, That all hindrances of the natural consequences of things will there be remov'd — Nothing will prevent the virtuous man's reaping the fruits of his virtue, nor will any thing hinder the whole of the dismal effects of vice from being felt by them, who have here allow'd themselves in it. And, if this be the case, than which nothing is more probable *, it is then

* *Verissimum credo, miseriam impiorum ex ipsa constitutione peccantium oriri, & electiones pravæ naturæ legibus sequi.*

Videmus corpora nostra posse in perpetuum mutilari, & artus ita dislocari & distorqueri, ut penitus ad actiones, quibus naturâ destinantur, inepti fiant. Cur non idem de mente sentiendum, scilicet posse illam pravis electionibus, passionibus, & affectibus ita à recto cogitandi tramite detorqueri, ut non minùs ad regendas actiones, prout recta ratio suadet, inhabilis & inepta fiat, quàm mancus pedibus ad cursum? — Si Deus igitur omnipotentiam non interponat; iidem errores, eadem ignorantia,

then quite clear, that all the hopes of the guilty from their numbers must be utterly vain — that it would be full as reasonable to think a plague could not be a dangerous distemper, because it is so infectious an one ; as to think that we shall be safe amidst our crimes, because of the multitude that share them.

WITH regard to the Goodness of God, how groundless our reliance must be upon it, when we act contrary to the ends for which we were made——when we neglect our opportunities, and abuse our capacities, will, I hope, be sufficiently plain to us, if we attend to the following short Remarks.

1. WE ascribe Goodness to God as a perfection ; but nothing can be a perfection in him, which has, morally speaking, a necessary tendency to make his creatures less perfect —— less careful to answer the ends of their creation ; and this the divine Goodness would certainly do, if it were indeed such as allow'd us nothing to fear, tho' we neglected

ignorantia, iidem perversæ mentis habitus, & obstinata in mala propensio, quæ nos à tramite recto hîc deducunt, in æternum nobiscum maneat, &c. King. de Orig. Mali.

to use rightly the abilities and opportunities afforded us *.

2. As God is the Governor of the world— is acknowledg'd so by all who own his being; we must, therefore, consider his Goodness, as that of a Governor, or, as consistent with, and agreeable to, a wise government: but can this be said of his Goodness, if it exempt from all punishment our willful and continu'd disobedience to his Laws, and thereby encourage us to disobey them?

3. ONE Attribute or Perfection of the Deity cannot clash with another; his Goodness, for instance, with his Justice: but the punishment of evil is as much a part of Justice, as the rewarding of good. To treat evil, as if it were not evil, can neither be agreeable to Justice or Truth; and this would be the case — Evil would be regarded as if it were not evil, did the Goodness of God so favour the willful offender, that his crimes would never receive their desert.

4. To restrain evil, to obstruct its progress, must be the care of a good Governor, nay

* [Ἐλεγε [Καίων] τοὺς δυναμένους κωλύειν τοὺς κακῶς ποιούντας, εἰς μὴ κωλύωσι, κατακλιεύειν. Plut. Apophtheg.

would

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would be the surest proof of his Goodness *. To punish, therefore, such as act contrary to the law of their nature——contrary to the well-being of Society, and therein contrary to their own and the common happiness, is not only a part of Justice, but even of Goodness itself. We could not consider God as good, had he not properly guarded against his Creatures corrupting themselves, and against that corruption extending itself: and what are the Discouragements to this, but in the way of punishment——but by the sufferings the guilty have to fear? The more there are who act in defiance of these sufferings, the more necessary it becomes to inflict them; and offenders can have no reason to think that the mercy of God will spare them, when the greatest mercy is shewn in obviating the mischief of such examples, by treating them according to what they have deserv'd.

LET us behold the Goodness of God in this light, and this is that in which we ought to see it——this is its true representation; and thus seen, it cannot but convince us how im-

* Πῶς ἴτε ἁγνὸς ὁ εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐστὶν. Plut. de Adul. & Am. dif.

of TIME. III

possible it is that we should have any thing to hope after a life unprofitably, vainly spent — how much such a Life has necessarily to fear.



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AS the design of these *Essays* is to recommend that Employment of Time, which suits our respective capacities and stations — the several relations in which we stand, and the hopes we entertain; I will conclude them with observing, more particularly, how usefully to the public — to their Sovereign, and to themselves, the noble Persons in the administration might be employ'd, if it were some part of their care to promote that sense of duty among us, the prevailing want of which we have at present such unhappy reason to lament.

I CANNOT, indeed, hear of the public affairs being chiefly directed by Their counsels who have the popular voice so favourable to their moral character; but I must please myself with the thoughts, that the time is at hand

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when decency and virtue will be on their return to us——when fashion will countenance duty, and vice, wherever unreform'd, will yet seek to be conceal'd.

DIFFICULT I grant it to find the remedy for such wide-spread corruption; but the counsels that have overcome the difficulties in which we lately saw ourselves, may be thought equal to any.

WHO that, two years since, consider'd the superiority of our enemies——the weakness of our allies——their vain efforts notwithstanding the large supplies we afforded them, and our utter inability to continue those supplies; who, that consider'd all this, did not preface an end to the war, then carrying on, which would be but an encouragement to renew it—an end to it by those cessions, which would increase the *power* of the conqueror, and lessen that from which alone there was any hopes of resisting him?

THEY who were most jealous of their country's honour, thought it sufficiently secur'd, if our confederates, by giving up a few of the fortresses taken from them, could have the rest they had lost, restor'd; and what they possess'd, confirm'd to them.

How

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How pleasing the view of an event, so far beyond our most sanguine expectations ! The wisdom of the Administration found the happy expedient of procuring peace to *Europe*, on terms that our warmest hopes could not propose to themselves — of settling a peace agreeable to every Power with which we were united ; a *peace*, by which our Allies regain all that War had taken from them, and *which*, in that very circumstance, has its continuance provided for, as far as human foresight can provide for it ; nothing being more likely to prevent the attempting conquests, than to destroy the hopes of keeping them.

THEY who have with such address remov'd the danger we had to apprehend from our enemy's power, may well be thought able to remedy, in some degree, the much greater we are in from our own vices.

IF, as is, unquestionably, the case, “ Laws “ are vain without Morals * ”, the well-being

* Quid leges sine moribus.

Vanæ proficiunt ? *Hor.* l. 3. Od. 24.

Dove la materia e corrotta le leggi bene ordinate non giovano. *Machiavel. Disc. sopra T. Liv.* l. 1. c. 17.

Non si trovano ne leggi, ne ordini, che bastino a frenare una universale corruttione — Come i buoni costumi, per mantenersi, hanno bisogno delle leggi, così le leggi, per osservarsi, hanno bisogno di buoni costumi. Cap. 18.

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of any Nation depends as much upon its Virtue, as upon its Laws. Slow the steps may be by which the destruction of the most profligate people advances ; as the most intemperate man may be several years before he ruins his constitution : but the event in each case is alike certain. It is as certain, that vice will at length destroy any State, as that it will any Individual. Every thing *We* have to fear of this kind, is, we fancy, *in all probability*, so remote, that it need not give us any concern. I heartily wish that it may prove as distant as it is believ'd : but what we like, we, in most instances, miscall likely ; and there are many reasons to conclude that we do it in the present.

ADMIT there were no ground to apprehend that so terrible an effect of our immorality could soon take place, yet may this immorality very reasonably alarm our Governors, from the difficulties it must create them in the discharge of their trust.

IT is an observation of ARISTOTLE, * “ That
“ the *most virtuous*, tho' they have the best
“ plea to raise commotions in a State, are,
“ notwithstanding, of All the farthest from

* Πάντων δὲ δυνατότατα μὲν αὖτὶς αἰσίουσιν, ἥμισυ δὲ τὸτο πράττειν
οἱ κατ' ἀρίστην διαφέρουσιν. De Repub. l. 5.

“ doing

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“ doing it.” *They* may, the most plausibly, disturb the peace of the commonwealth, to place themselves at the head of it, as they best deserve that station ; yet is it what they will never seek by such a method. But it is a very small part of their praise, that the public quiet will never suffer from their ambitious *views* ; they have *none* by which it will be endanger’d, To promote it is their principal concern.

THE *virtuous man* makes all the allowance to which his Superiors are entitled from such a variety of affairs under their notice——from such different humours and tempers as they have to manage——so frequently oblig’d to see and hear with the eyes and ears of others——so beset with those who endeavour to deceive them——so utterly unable to guard against the treachery, or perverseness, or selfishness of many they must employ——so often constrain’d to pursue the measures they disapprove, to take the blame they are farthest from deserving, to conceal what would be their fullest vindication——so incapable of gratifying every suitor, and in most of the favours they confer, granting to one what many solicit ; their compliance by no means sure to oblige, their refusal always certain to disgust.

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He studies, in the way it suits his station, to render the administration of government easy, that they who are fittest for, may be invited to it—that they may not be induc'd to decline it from any ill returns their endeavours for the common good can expect, from any hard censure or unreasonable opposition they have to fear.

ON what is well done by a Ministry, *He* bestows all the praise due to it, both as being due, and as there is not a stronger incitement to proceed in worthy actions, than the just acknowledgment of those that have been perform'd.

To what admits of a favourable construction *He* gives it, as it is the Magistrate's especial claim, and as the supposal that faults have been avoided, is no small check on their being multiply'd.

WHERE failures are manifest, *He* is sparing in censuring them; knowing that the best and wisest may err, and that severity of reproach will rather occasion an indifference towards the wrong that has been done, than a disposition to rectify it.

His warmest opposition has nothing in view but that right measures may be pursu'd, and is wholly govern'd by the considerations likeliest
to

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to produce them : it forbears to exasperate — seeks to convince — approves regret that it should have ever been requir'd, and only has its continuance in that of its just cause.

How, on the other hand, do the vices of a nation operate on its Government ?

THAT certain Poverty in which the idle keep, and into which the extravagant bring themselves, they constantly make the fault of their Rulers.

THEY who will not work, or who spend more than they can gain by their work, are always loud in their clamours against a management of affairs that starves them. It is not any misconduct of his own that breaks the Trader, but the decay of Trade. The man of estate is not ruin'd by living beyond it, but by the Taxes with which it is burthen'd. Whatever inconveniences the bad feel, they are sure to charge on a bad Administration. Press'd by their wants their study is to embroil. Their resource is Disorder ; which, therefore, they industriously promote ; as the necessitous villain fires the house he is desirous to plunder.

AMONG the causes, assign'd by the Poet, of the civil war he makes his subject, we have this—It was * *Multis utile, Many found their*

* *Multis utile bellum. Lucani Pharf. l. 1. 182.*

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interest in it. The *many* whom their vices had beggar'd, or would do it soon, were only to be help'd by such a general confusion as, putting the Law out of its course, licens'd the violence that would enrich them.

WHAT the *Roman* State *suffer'd* from its necessitous members, every State may, likewise, reasonably *fear*. A number of men without property and principle, in whatever country they are, must be regarded as avow'd enemies to its peace——as ever ready to excite, or foment those tumults, from which, let who will suffer, they will gain.

BE the most favourable case suppos'd, that they are not tempted to seek a support from the distress of their Superiors, as having one from their liberality: what uneasiness and trouble even then ensue from men never to be satisfy'd? Always indigent, *they* are always importuning: Let *their* interest be promoted, *they* regard not whose is prejudic'd: in every trust conferr'd on *them*, wholly attentive to the profit it will yield, *they* give themselves no concern how it ought to be discharg'd, or what odium *their* Patron must incur by *their* failure in the due discharge of it. No reliance is to be had on any service from them, but as it makes for their advantage. Ready, indeed, they

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they may be, while it suits their selfish views, to obey Directions ; but as ready they, *generally*, are to betray their Director, and *always* dispos'd, when they see his power declining, to desert him. Wretches ! who can only be favour'd when wanted, and who, therefore, dread nothing more than to have the public in such a happy situation, that they who conduct its affairs need no support, but what they can have from their own abilities and integrity.

Much trouble an administration may apprehend from *them* whom vice hath made, or keeps indigent, when *they* are prompted by none of any rank or fortune to turbulent and seditious attempts. But how much worse has it to fear, when such persons have, for their Leaders, men of fortune and rank, but of no conscience——giving full scope to their envy, or ambition, or the rage their disappointments create ? These, so supported, must be able frequently to distress a government, how wise soever the measures may be that it pursues. Nor will they have only the needy profligate to join them in their opposition, but sticking at no falsehood——professing themselves influenc'd by the noblest principle — avowing the love of their country to be the sole motive of their conduct——disclaiming all manner of

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selfish views — having ever in their mouths Liberty, Property, Public Good ; Many of the best intentions will be deceiv'd by them, and ready to go into any scheme of reducing a Power, the abuse of which gives such worthy patriots so deep a concern.

THESE considerations will hold under every Prince we can have ; they will be arguments why his Ministers should not be indifferent what notions of duty obtain among us. But the friends to the reigning family are to regard its interests as more especially affected by a prevailing Libertinism.

THEY who have no sense of Religion, judge it of no consequence what their Prince's Religion is, whether he is of any or none, is Atheist or Deist, Papist or Protestant : ready to suit the profession of *their faith* to what he declares *his*, they are quite unconcern'd what *it* may be. Nothing appears to them more ridiculous than to be under any attachment to their Sovereign for the manner of worship he countenances — for his favouring the Church of *England* more than the Church of *Rome*. All, therefore, who think thus, can be neither enemies to the Pretender to the Crown, nor friends to the possessor of it, from any motive of conscience, or, from that principle which

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which makes us act with the greatest spirit and vigour, both against them whom it induces us to oppose, and for them whom it engages us to defend.

LET then the Papists increase their numbers, as it is much to be fear'd they do, or but continue as numerous as they are, while the members of the reform'd Churches are becoming only such in name, as regardless of any other religious persuasion, as of the popish; — *The person* whom the former would make our Ruler, will have *a large body of men*, some of them considerable for their rank, and many of them for their fortune, united to him by the strongest tie mankind can be under to any — espousing his interest upon views that will keep them firm to it, whatever *his* disappointments may be, or *their* sufferings — exactly apprised of their strength — acting in perfect concert — capable of prosecuting their designs without fear of a discovery, and on any prospect of success sure to find at hand the most powerful foreign support. *He*, on the other hand, who is, and whom may Providence long continue, our Sovereign! will have *his* cause espous'd upon *considerations that* have no such force — *that* wholly regard present convenience, and therefore must be as mutable

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as such convenience——*that* upon every trifling disgust are overlook'd, and would be of no manner of weight when there appears much danger or little advantage in adhering to *him*. He cannot know on whom he may depend: by far the greatest part of those he must employ will think of nothing so much as taking care of themselves——their counsels will be different as their schemes, all centring in their private interest; and when this is to regulate their secrecy, their fidelity, their zeal, it must be obvious how far these will proceed.

90 WILL it be said, that they who are not attach'd to a *Protestant* Prince, from the consideration of his being such, are most firmly so from the regard they have to their Liberty and Property?

THE Papists would answer, That they know not any connection between a Popish and an Arbitrary ruler——That they have a large share of property, and cannot be suppos'd to have the least relish of slavery——That, thinking as we do of our civil rights, and having the same desire with us to preserve them, they must have the same aversion to any Prince who is likely to invade them——That Princes of all religions agree in the endeavour to increase their power; and perhaps as many attempts towards it may
have

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have been made by those who have been no Papists, as by those who have been the most bigotted.

It, certainly, may be truly answer'd, That common foldiers and common sea-men, day-labourers and the meaner artificers can have very little inducement to defend any government, from the property and civil liberty under it which is their share; and that, in the case suppos'd of an universal corruption in our morals, the greatest part of those in a higher rank must be either so distress'd by their vices, or so intent on the means to support themselves in vices, the expence of which their present income cannot long bear, that they will be under no tie to any Prince, merely as dispos'd to govern by Law.

THE wealth of a nation, that share of its wealth for the bare securing of which all change of government is thought sure to be oppos'd, is in few hands in comparison of the whole people; and considering these few fortunate persons as having hitherto liv'd at their ease, in full enjoyment of the world; and acting in defence of their Sovereign without any sense of duty — without any hopes beyond the grave; how far they would hazard their persons in his defence, I had much rather their

Addressees

Addressees should declare, than he experience. As men of fortune now live, the unprincipled part of them can by no means seem the fittest men for any service of danger or hardship.

In general, it is most certain, that the vicious have from no Prince so much to hope, as from an arbitrary one. They best suit his purposes, and are, therefore, surest of his favour. Their Liberty is Licentiousness. The freedom they like is not what the Law affords, but what it controuls. While their luxury and lust can have full scope under an *arbitrary power*, no opposition to it will ever endanger their lives; if they should draw their swords against him who would introduce *it*, pay or promises must be the motive: They must be offer'd more to fight against, than they are likely to get by fighting for it.

I AM very sensible how ill a sound there is in *Reformation*; That it is a term too often in the mouths of the worst of men, and a pretext for the worst designs—— That the sincerest advocates for it are thought to have more zeal than discretion. But, certainly, there is full as much to be said against neglecting it wholly, as against prosecuting it indiscreetly.

THE chief business of the Legislature, annually, is, in some sense, Reformation; most of

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of its Acts are a species thereof—are so many new regulations—correct what is faulty—supply what is defective—remedy some or other inconvenience.

THAT disorders will get into every community is undeniable, and it is alike so, that no community can be well govern'd where proper care is not taken to redress them—to remove them wholly, or to prevent their attaining an height that may endanger the public safety.

SOME disorders may not unreasonably be thought below the notice of an Administration; others may be wisely consider'd as less dangerously conniv'd at than remedy'd; but *where* neither of these is the case, *where* the disorder is far from being a slight one, *where* its removal by gentle methods is abundantly less dangerous, than a connivance which, seeming to countenance, must increase it; if *there* the Magistrates interposition may be imprudently expected, one cannot conjecture, from the reason of things, wherein it is requisite.

THE progress of Immorality among us every where discovers itself; nor is there any thing more certain in Mathematics, than it is in Politics, that the virtue of a nation is its strength—that it becomes weak in the degree it becomes corrupt. And that there are
methods

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methods of promoting throughout this kingdom a quite different sense of duty from what at present prevails in it, which can have nothing in them of danger or inconvenience, I am only hindred from affirming, by the deference I pay to those who have not pursu'd them.

“*—You the *Roman* State with Arms defend,
“Adorn with Morals, and by Laws amend.”

It is well known to whom and of whom this was the compliment. The gradation here is pretty remarkable. AUGUSTUS's military glory is but the first step therein; the least part of his praise was that he defended *Italy*, what did him honour was that he reform'd it †. To have regulated the manners of his country-men, was as preferable to his having secur'd their persons, as the right use of life is to its mere enjoyment.

WE find mankind, in all ages, acknowledging those who civiliz'd them as their greatest

* Res Italas armis tutaris, moribus ornas,
Legibus emendas.

† So Ode 15. lib. 4. ————— Ordinem
Rectum, & vaganti fræna licentiæ
Injecit; amovitque culpas.
bene-

benefactors ——— regarding this as their second and noblest formation, and as entitling those to whom they ow'd it to the highest honours they could pay.

AND if the first rough and very imperfect draught of civil polity has been every where reputed such a blessing—been thought to merit such acknowledgments ; we cannot be at a loss to conceive how a nation would regard *them*, from whom it deriv'd regulations, manners, and principles suitable to the present improvement of human Reason ; and which must give the Society wherein they obtain, as great advantages over any in the earlier ages of the world, as the best govern'd state in *Europe* can claim over the *Hurons* and *Iroquois*.

THE Statesman thus consulting our happiness would unite all parties in doing justice to his worth. The generous contention among us would be, whose affection towards him should most distinguish itself.

How much a nation is profited by the policy that disconcerts the schemes of its enemies, or by the valour that defeats their armies, few regard, except in some extraordinary case, at the time the transaction passes ; and in succeeding generations all sense of it wears off : but the *benefit* done by making a people better—
by

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by reforming them, falls under the notice of all, is felt by all, and disposes them to the greatest esteem of him from whom it was receiv'd *. Such a friend to virtue, as he is the friend to all mankind, is sure to have the worthiest of them, in every age, interesting themselves in the honours paid him, preserving his memory, and, to enforce the imitation of him, ever dwelling on his praise. The reward of his endeavours will be thus the noblest they can on earth receive, and this how infinitely short of what they may finally expect!

EVERY one who wishes the prosperity of our country, must wish a change in our morals. Without it what, alas! must be our fate under the first enterprising Prince in a neighbouring nation, or under the first in our own, who is dispos'd to arbitrary sway, and knows how to conduct the means that offer themselves for obtaining it?

WHEN we cease to be morally free—when our reason is subjected to our passions and appetites, a proper application to these

* Si quæret Pater urbium

Subscribi statuis; indomitam audeat

Refrænare licentiam,

Clarus postgenitis. *Hor. lib. iii. Od. 24.*

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soon puts an end to our civil liberty. Govern'd by our Lust, we are prepar'd to be so by him who will enable us to gratify that Lust. Slaves to our palate, we are of course such to him who can support us in our luxury. Our heart set on those fooleries which are call'd making a figure in the world, we readily agree that he who in them gives us *our will*, shall have us in all things else subservient to *his*. Must our ambition be satisfy'd, our Law is the Word of him who can advance us. Enthrall'd by our fears, he who can hurt us is implicitly obey'd.

THE connection, therefore, between Virtue and civil Liberty is evident. Virtue only qualifies us for Liberty——enables us to understand its just value, and disposes us to its proper use. Virtue alone fixes in us the desire of Liberty—arms us against each compliance that will endanger it, and puts us on the conduct that must preserve it.

VIRTUE alone makes us Masters of ourselves: and, when it will not suffer us to be govern'd by our own mere will, how can it but secure us from subjecting ourselves to that of any other person?

A REMARK of ALGERNOON SIDNEY's, who had made Government his particular study, and

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who

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who was, certainly, no bigot in Religion, is the only one I have to add.

Virtue is the dictate of Reason, or the remains of the Divine Light, by which men are made beneficent and beneficial to each other. Religion proceeds from the same spring, and tends to the same end. And the Good of mankind so entirely depends upon these Two, that no people ever enjoy'd any thing worth desiring, that was not the product of them. Discourses concerning Government, p. 190.

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T H E E N D.



